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Chapter I
Introduction

1 Introduction
This dissertation consists of four essays dealing with issues in the regulated insurance
market of health care. Contemporary political discussions about health care mostly
focus on rising health care expenditure. In the hope of curbing this surge, several
countries have instituted competition between social health insurers and introduced
the concept of ”managed competition” (Van de Ven et al., 2007). However, social
health insurers are still subject to many regulations (Enthoven, 1986), including the
imposition of risk-independent premiums. In the United States, these premiums are
community-rated at the level of a firm’s employees; in the Netherlands and Germany,
the premium comes from a uniform contribution rate derived from labor income; and
in Switzerland, uniform premiums per capita are charged by a given insurer (Zweifel
and Breuer, 2006). Due to this regulation, health insurers have incentive to select
favorable risks (Pauly, 1984). Enrolling high risks leads to expected losses, while
enrolling low risks leads to expected gains. However, for the economy as a whole, risk
selection is a zero-sum game and yields higher health care expenditure across the board.
According to Zweifel et al. (2009, Chapter 7), compulsory health insurance and
risk-independent premiums allow three types of measures to avoid risk selection:
(1) An open enrollment policy that prevents direct risk selection (i.e., an insurer
controls contract signatories based on observable characteristics correlated to risk
type); (2) Regulation of the benefit package that prevents indirect risk selection (i.e.,
an insurer influences enrollment indirectly by offering contracts with benefits that
appeal to certain risk types); and (3) Risk adjustment to reduce incentives for risk
selection. Risk adjustment makes insurers with an above-average share of favorable
risks cross-subsidize insurers with many unfavorable risks. While an open enrollment
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policy underlies all chapters of this dissertation, Chapters 2 and 3 deal specifically
with measure (2), while Chapters 4 and 5 contribute to the topic of measure (3).
Chapters 2 and 3 provide experimental measurements of preferences for the list
of benefits. From a theoretical viewpoint, minimum as well as maximum benefits
should be defined, forcing insurers to offer important high-risk benefits in addition to
preventing them from including services that particularly appeal to low risks. However,
decisions about inclusion of a specific treatment or pharmaceutical product on the
list of benefits should be made according to the insured’s willingness-to-pay and the
costs of the benefit. Chapter 2 presents evidence for the case of a new pharmaceutical
product, viz. a long-acting insulin analogue. A discrete-choice experiment is conducted
in Germany to estimate willingness-to-pay of social statutory health insurance (GKV)
members, including both actual patients (type 1 and insulin-dependent type 2
diabetics) and potential patients (non-diabetics and insulin-naive type 2 diabetics).
By including two financial attributes (copayment and health insurance contributions)
preferences for the mode of financing were elicited.
Compared to Germany, Switzerland offers more elements of choice in statutory health
insurance. These elements give health insurers more opportunities for risk selection,
but consumers also benefit from this diversity, being able to choose a contract that
corresponds more closely to their preferences. Chapter 3 reexamines a discrete-choice
experiment conducted by Becker (2006, Chapters 6-8) in Switzerland, estimating
willingness-to-pay of the Swiss population for various proposed reforms concerning
the list of benefits (reimbursement of alternative medicine treatments, restriction
to generics, and immediate access to new treatment methods), as well as financing
(copayment and deductible levels).
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on risk adjustment as the third option of secondary regulation
to prevent risk selection. The design of an optimal risk-adjustment formula is a widely
discussed topic. Since its introduction in 1996, the Swiss formula has been based solely
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on age and gender. Effective in 2012, the formula will include a third risk adjuster,
”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home more than three days during the previous
year”, to mitigate risk selection. These two chapters analyze the consequences of this
refinement. Chapter 4 has two objectives. First, it analyzes the effects of the third
risk adjuster on the volume of risk adjustment (or, more precisely, on the volume of
cross-subsidization between the insured). Second, it addresses how a cap on the volume
of risk adjustment can be placed so that opportunity costs in terms of incentives for
risk selection are minimized.
A case study forms the core of Chapter 5. This study shows the consequences of this
fine-tuning on a health insurer that seems not to be a ”cherry-picker”, but an insurer
among the forefront in conforming to the stated objectives of Swiss health policy, i.e.
to achieve savings through Managed Care.
The essays adopt different points of view. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the insured’s
preferences, with distinctions of high and low risks central to Chapter 2. Consequences
of health insurance regulation for the economy as a whole are presented in Chapter 4,
while Chapter 5 focuses on a single health insurer’s perspective. However, all the essays
are based on individual panel data. More than 1,100 enrollees of the German statutory
health insurance were interviewed face-to-face for the discrete-choice experiment of
Chapter 2. For the experiment presented in Chapter 3, 1,000 telephone interviews of
enrollees of Swiss statutory health insurance were conducted. Three large Swiss health
insurers provided data about holders of basic health insurance over five years for Chap-
ters 4 and 5, resulting in records of 2.78 million insured. This number corresponds to
an average market share of more than 25 percent. Additionally, a medium-sized health
insurer provided data for the simulations of Chapter 5. Concerning methodological
common grounds, Chapters 2 and 3 share the discrete-choice approach. Econometric
estimation of health care expenditure underlies the results of Chapters 4 and 5.
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The topic of this dissertation can also be considered from an efficiency point of
view. If the list of benefits in statutory social health insurance includes treatments
or pharmaceuticals that the insured exhibit a willingness-to-pay lower than costs,
health care resources are used inefficiently. In the case of Chapter 2, insulin-dependent
diabetics might have a high enough (ex-post) willingness-to-pay for the new insulin
product. However, for the reimbursement to be justified, ex-ante willingness-to-pay by
the non-affected insured has to be sufficiently high as well.
Using the results of discrete-choice experiments as the basis for decision-making
may lead to efficiency if estimated willingness-to-pay indeed corresponds to actual
willingness-to-pay. Recent literature shows many problems and challenges, such as
designing questionnaires and applying the newest econometric methods (Hoyos, 2010).
Chapter 3 contributes to this literature by showing that the commonly assumed linear
form of the utility function may be a risky choice in discrete-choice experiments.
Risk adjustment is generally introduced to mitigate incentives for risk selection.
However, as explored in Chapter 4, this can also have effects on insurers’ quest for
efficiency. A refinement of the risk-adjustment formula would increasingly shelter
insurers from financial risk, undermining their incentive to improve efficiency. For this
reason, a government might consider simply capping the volume of risk adjustment.
This then exposes insurers to some residual financial risk. Chapter 4 further studies
how risk-adjustment values can be reduced to minimize the increase in health care
expenditure variance borne by the insurer, thus also minimizing the risk-selection effort.
Insolvency and the eventual market exit of insurers who only survived thanks to cream
skimming may be considered to be efficiency enhancing. However, Chapter 5 outlines
how the fine-tuning of the risk-adjustment formula may also cause an innovative
health insurer, who had successfully implemented Managed Care to lower rates of
hospitalization, to go bankrupt. This threat to survival may trigger adjustments in the
insurer’s risk-management strategy, causing efficiency losses to tax-payers, employees,
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patients, and the economy as a whole.
Chapter 6 concludes by stating the major policy implications and disclosing possible
future extensions.
Note that Peter Zweifel co-authored Chapters 2, 4, and 5, Patrick Eugster co-authored
Chapter 4, and Johannes Schoder co-authored Chapter 5. I am indebted to Willard
G. Manning for the intellectual input of Chapter 3. Chapter 2 is submitted to Phar-
macoEconomics, and Chapter 3 to Health Economics. Chapter 4 is published in the
Journal of Health Economics and Chapter 5 in the International Journal of the Eco-
nomics of Business.
Miche`le Sennhauser
Zurich, December 2010

Chapter II
A New Pharmaceutical:
Is it Worth the Money? Whose Money?
Miche`le Sennhauser and Peter Zweifel
Submitted to
PharmacoEconomics

2 A New Pharmaceutical: Is it Worth the Money?
Whose Money?
2.1 Introduction
Health care expenditure (HCE) and especially pharmaceutical expenditure is rising
in almost all developed countries. For example, in the United States the share of
pharmaceutical expenditures in total HCE increased from 9 percent in 1996 to 12
percent in 2008 (OECD, 2010). In an attempt to curb this surge, several countries
have introduced a cost-effectiveness standard for new pharmaceuticals. This led to
the creation of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MEOPAC) scheme
in Australia, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United
Kingdom, and the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG) in
Germany. In Germany, the pharmaceutical bill paid for by statutory health insurance
(GKV) increased from Euro 22 billion (bn.) in 2004 to Euro 26 bn. in 2007, or from
1.00 percent of GDP to 1.07 percent (Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, 2009). Before
2007, pharmaceutical innovations had to meet safety and efficacy benchmarks to be
included in the GKV list of benefits. Now, they also have to be cost-effective.
This study seeks to provide evidence for deciding whether or not a new pharma-
ceutical for insulin therapy, a long-acting insulin analogue1, should be included in
1The product considered in this chapter is ”Insulin detemir” by Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH.
Modern insulin therapy uses long- and short-acting insulin in combination. Whereas rapid-acting
insulin meets insulin need during mealtimes, long-acting insulin assures base-level supply. Both rapid-
and long-acting insulin can be human or insulin analogue. Whereas human insulin is genetically
identical to insulin from the human pancreas, insulin analogue differs slightly to improve the insulin’s
properties.
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the German benefit list of social health insurance. So far, the standard of treatment
has been neutral protamine Hagedorn (NPH) insulin which is human insulin. The
new pharmaceutical promises several medical advantages, such as fewer events of
hypoglycemia, less weight gain (or even weight loss), easier preparation, and more
flexibility in injection time (for a list of references on clinical outcomes studies, see
Section 2.3 below). These potential advantages come with an average cost of Euro
226 per year and diabetic (in Germany). Concerning the cost-effectiveness of insulin
analogues compared to NPH insulin, there have been several studies presenting mixed,
but mostly positive results. Whereas e.g. Cameron and Bennett (2009) find the
pharmaceutical not to be cost-effective, other studies disagree, e.g. Valentine et al.
(2007) for type 2 diabetics2 in the United States.
There are two reasons why this preparation is of special interest. First, diabetes
prevalence is higher then ever in industrialized countries and continues to increase
rapidly. The World Health Organization projects the number of diabetics worldwide
to rise from 170 million (mn.) in 2000 to 360 mn. by 2030 (World Health Organization,
2007, Wild et al., 2004). For the United States Huang et al. (2009) estimate the
number of diabetics to increase from 23.7 mn. in 2009 to 44.1 mn. patients in 2034.
Annual diabetes-related expenditure is expected to rise from USD 113 bn. to USD 336
bn. during the same period. The prevalence of diabetes in Germany is 4 to 10 percent
between ages 40 and 59 and 18 to 28 percent for ages above 60 (Hauner, 2008). Second,
long-acting insulin analogues may well constitute a test case. IQWiG recommended
to drop long-acting insulin analogues from the benefit list, judging it not to be
cost-effective (IQWiG, 2009 and IQWiG, 2010). However, these recommendations
did not take into account preferences of (potential) patients. Several aspects of the
drug which may be innovative from the patient’s perspective were neglected or judged
2In case of type 1 diabetes the body does not produce insulin. It is usually diagnosed in children
and young adults and has to be treated with insulin from the beginning. In type 2 diabetes, either the
body does not produce enough insulin or the cells ignore the insulin. This type is usually diagnosed in
the elderly. Diabetics of type 2 are called ”insulin-naive” if they are not treated with insulin (yet) but
with oral anti-diabetics. However, during the course of their disease they will need insulin treatment
as well (American Diabetes Association, 2010).
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as therapeutically unimportant. The (potential) patients’ preferences can be elicited
in a discrete-choice experiment (DCE). With the inclusion of a financial attribute,
willingness-to-pay (WTP, or willingness-to-accept (WTA)) values can be attached to
the characteristics of the product, permitting to express its (dis-)utility in terms of
money. From the point of view of the insured (comprising both actual and potential
patients), inclusion of the new product in the list of benefits is justified if they exhibit
a WTP that exceeds the extra cost of the treatment.
To the knowledge of the authors, there has been no WTP study concerning long-acting
insulin analogues. This study presents a DCE comparing insulin analogue with NPH
insulin conducted in Germany in the Fall of 2007. Participants in the DCE are 1,110
members of statutory health insurance GKV, of whom 200 suffer from type 1 diabetes,
150 from insulin-treated type 2 diabetes, and 150 from insulin-naive type 2 diabetes.
Distinguishing these groups allows to estimate ex-ante WTP for non-diabetics and
insulin-naive diabetics on the one hand and ex-post WTP for insulin-treated patients
on the other. Four attributes describing differences in insulin therapy between NPH
insulin and insulin analogue were included according to medical outcomes studies:
Risk of hypoglycemia, weight gain during the first six months of insulin treatment,
need to swing (not shake) the insulin before injections, and flexibility with regard
to time of injection. There are two attributes for the mode of payment, financing
through patients themselves (copayment) and through increased health insurance
contributions, respectively. The inclusion of two financial attributes permits to test
whether the new drug has a favorable benefit-cost ratio regardless of the boosting of
WTP caused by health insurance.
There are four main questions to be answered. (1) Is there positive WTP for long-
acting insulin analogue by the members of German statutory health insurance? (2) If
so, which product attributes contribute to WTP? (3) Is there preference heterogeneity
between non-affected non-diabetics and insulin-naive type 2 diabetics on the one hand
and type 1 diabetics and insulin-treated type 2 diabetics on the other? (4) Is the
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benefit-cost ratio of the new drug favorable regardless of whether it is financed jointly
through increased GKV contributions or by patients through copayment?
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives an overview of cost-effectiveness
studies concerning insulin analogue and of preference studies regarding insulin therapy.
Section 2.3 presents the interview strategy and questionnaire design with the attributes
and levels. Then theory behind DCEs is briefly presented in Section 2.4 with emphasis
on the difference between ex-ante and ex-post WTP measurement. Hypotheses are
formulated in Section 2.5 before presenting descriptive statistics in Section 2.6. Section
2.7 contains the empirical evidence and hypothesis tests. The four questions raised are
answered in the concluding Section 2.8.
2.2 Literature Review
Cost-Effectiveness Studies
Existing cost-effectiveness studies of the insulin analogue use quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs) as the benefit measure and the incremental cost effectiveness ratio
(ICER) as the valuation criteria. Until recently, they focused on the treatment of
type 1 patients. For the UK, Palmer et al. (2004) and Palmer et al. (2007) find
improvements of 0.09 and 0.66 QALYs, resulting in ICER of GBP 19,285 and GBP
2,500, respectively, which compare favorable with the ICER of GBP 30,000 used by
NICE. These estimates are confirmed by Palmer et al. (2008) for Denmark with an
ICER of DKK 55,867 or GBP 6,600. In their multi-country study, Gschwend et al.
(2009) conclude that the insulin analogue is likely to be a dominant treatment strategy
for type 1 patients in Belgium, Germany, and Spain, and highly cost-effective in
France and Italy with an ICER of Euro 519 and Euro 3,256 per QALY, respectively.
For the United States, Leichter (2008) found the pharmaceutical to be cost-effective
due to lower incidence of acute hypoglycemic events and costly, chronic complications
such as nephropathy. In the same vein, Valentine et al. (2006) estimate an ICER of
USD 14,974. With regard to type 2 patients the findings are slightly more mixed.
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While Valentine et al. (2007) estimate an even lower ICER of USD 6,269 than for
type 1 patients, Cameron and Bennett (2009) arrive at USD 387,729, leading them to
conclude that long-acting analogues are unlikely to present an efficient use of health
care resources.
WTP Studies
For all its popularity, the cost-effectiveness measure is not satisfactory from an
economic point of view for two main reasons. First, QALYs focus exclusively on health
outcomes, neglecting attributes of the treatment process such as fear, isolation, and
confinement. Second, this measure does not allow to pit resources devoted to health
against resources devoted to other uses. Specifically, it fails to reflect the preferences
of citizens who may favor an expansion of the health budget, with the consequence
that the threshold ICER value (e.g. the GBP 30,000/QALY applied by NICE) could
be adjusted upward. By way of contrast, measurement of WTP values permits to
compare marginal benefit to marginal cost, both expressed in money.
The first WTP study concerning insulin therapy is Davey et al. (1998) in Australia.
The authors compared insulin lispro, the first rapid-acting insulin analogue, with
neutral (regular) insulin using a contingent-valuation approach. Respondents first
were presented with the descriptions of two types of insulins and had to choose one.
Then, they were taken through a series of ”bid-up” questions to determine their
maximum WTP. The sample consisted of both type 1 and type 2 diabetics who had
been treated with insulin before. The same method was applied by Dranitsaris et al.
(2000) to elicit WTP for the rapid-acting insulin analogue Humalog Mix 25. Unlike
the first study, the sample was drawn from the general tax-paying public. Sadri et al.
(2005) analyzed WTP for inhaled insulin, using the payment scale method. The study
involved type 1 and type 2 diabetics and presented results both for insulin-naive and
insulin-dependent patients.
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In contrast to the contingent-valuation approach, the levels of all attributes charac-
terizing the alternative are allowed to change in a DCE, which makes participants
repeatedly choose between the status quo and an alternative. The first DCE study
concerning insulin therapy is Aristides et al. (2004) who compared Humalog Mix 25,
an insulin analogue, with rapid-acting human insulin Humulin 30/70 and found signifi-
cant WTP in five European countries. Hauber et al. (2009) elicited preferences in a DCE
for oral diabetes treatment in type 2 patients through a web-enabled survey. Special
emphasis was on causes for non-adherence. Guimara˜es et al. (2009a) and Guimara˜es
et al. (2009b) investigated preferences for oral versus injectable insulin therapy in a
DCE. They found that once the psychological barrier to initiating insulin therapy had
been overcome, patients accommodated and accepted injectable therapy as a treatment
option.
2.3 The Experiment
Sample and Interview Strategy
This DCE was conducted in Germany in the Fall of 2007. Because one of the
research questions is whether financing insulin analogue through contributions to
statutory health insurance GKV or through copayment makes a difference in terms
of preferences, only adult GKV members (some 90 percent of the population) were
asked to participate. A professional market research institute specialized in health
care issues was commissioned to recruit individuals and to perform the interviews,
which were face-to-face by trained field investigators. Interviewers found participants
mainly through their private contacts with people regularly taking part in surveys.
Out of the total 1,110 respondents, 602 do not suffer from diabetes, 202 suffer
from type 1, and 306 from type 2 diabetes. Within the type 2 diabetics group, a
distinction is made between insulin-naive and insulin-treated patients (152 and 154
respondents, respectively). Diabetics are oversampled to be able to study heterogeneity
in preferences. While the sample design allocated the non-diabetics randomly across
the 16 La¨nder (states), ages, and gender, it distributed the type 2 diabetics equally
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over the three age groups, 46-55, 56-65, and over 65 because type 2 diabetes occurs
almost exclusively past age 45. The minimum duration of diabetes treatment (insulin
injections or oral therapy) was six months. Because it is very difficult to find patients
suffering from type 1 diabetes, randomization was limited to the 16 La¨nder in this case.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire is divided into four parts. Part 1: The interview begins with
questions about the respondent’s health (general health status, regular consumption
of pharmaceuticals, chronic illness, body mass index (BMI), diabetes) and health
insurance (such as yearly contribution or supplementary insurance). This part is the
same for all participants. Part 2: This part of the survey distinguishes between non-
diabetics, insulin-treated diabetics, and insulin-naive diabetics. For non-diabetics it
contains detailed information about diabetes and its treatment. Respondents are asked
to indicate their (subjective) probability of becoming insulin-dependent during their
lifetime (using a visual analog scale). Patients treated with insulin are asked about
the course of their disease, their insulin treatment, and its side effects. Insulin-naive
patients are presented with information about diabetes and its treatment as well.
They are asked how long they have suffered from diabetes, their treatment, and side
effects. They are made to indicate their (subjective) lifetime probability of depending
on insulin (again using a visual analog scale). Part 3: This part is the same for all
participants. To prepare them for the DCE, the attributes are explained in detail,
with special emphasis on the two payment vehicles ”copayment” and ”increase in
contribution to health insurance”. Since the interviews were face-to-face, respondents
had the possibility to ask questions, and interviewers to offer more explanation. Then,
the insulin used in current therapy is described to respondents (status quo). Eight
times, an alternative type of insulin with changed attribute levels (alternative, see
below) was presented and respondents asked to choose between the alternative and
the status quo. Part 4: The interview finishes with socioeconomic items (gender,
age, education, and residence). The last question is monthly household income to be
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indicated on a visual analog scale to ensure a high response rate.
Attributes
Although both rapid- and long-acting insulin is required for successful therapy, this
study only considers long-acting insulin. Current treatment guidelines use long-acting
NPH insulin to provide base-level supply. This therapy constitutes the fixed status
quo. It is defined by four attributes, which serve to reflect the differences in the
properties of long-acting NPH insulin and insulin analogue. In contradistinction to
other DCEs, no pretest was therefore necessary to establish the relevant attributes.
They are the following.
Risk of hypoglycemia (Hypo, see Table 2.1) is one of the main side effects of insulin
therapy. Its incidence depends on the individual, the dose of insulin needed, individual
habits, and the insulin preparation. On average the number of hypoglycemic events
can be estimated at 1 to 2 per week (Sreenan et al., 2008 and discussions with
diabetologists). With a time horizon of up to six months (see weight attribute
below), this puts the risk at 100 percent in the status quo. Most studies suggest
that incidence is lower with insulin analogue than with NPH insulin (see Vague
et al., 2002, Hermansen et al., 2004, Home et al., 2004, Kolendorf et al., 2004,
Robertson et al., 2004, Russell-Jones et al., 2004, Russell-Jones, 2007, Dornhorst
et al., 2008, Marre et al., 2009 and for meta-analyses Raskin, 2007, Satish and
Ramachandra, 2008, Demssie et al., 2009, Freeman, 2009, Hermansen et al., 2009,
and Monami et al., 2009). A study that does not find any differences in the frequency
of hypoglycemia compared to NPH insulin is Umpierrez et al. (2009), while Singh
et al. (2009) report mixed results. A Cochrane review (Horvath et al., 2007) concluded
fewer analogue users experienced symptomatic overall or nocturnal hypoglycemic
episodes compared to NPH insulin users. The magnitude of the decrease varies across
studies. Hermansen et al. (2009) found a reduction of total hypoglycemic events of
over 50 percent, Kolendorf et al. (2004) of 18 percent, and Vague et al. (2002) of
22 percent. IQWiG wrote in its final report (IQWiG, 2009) that insulin analogue
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Table 2.1: DCE attributes, labels and levels
Overall risk of hypoglycemia Status quo: 100%
(Hypo) Alternative: 100% / 75% / 50%
Weight change Status quo: + 2,5 kg
(Weight) Alternative: + 2.5 kg / ± 0 kg / – 1.0 kg
Swinging before injection Status quo: Necessary
(Swing) Alternative: Necessary / Not necessary
Time of injection Status quo: Predetermined
(Flexibility) Alternative: Predetermined / Not predetermined
Copayment per year Status quo: None
(Copayment) Alternatives: None / Euro 50 / Euro 150 / Euro 300
Health insurance contribution Status quo: Individual contribution
(Contribution) Alternatives: ± 0% / +0.5% / +1.0% / +2.0%
Note: Euro 1 ≈ USD 1.4 at 2008 exchange rates
significantly lowers the risk of severe (analogue: 0.0 percent vs. NPH: 2.1 percent), of
mild (analogue: 57.0 percent vs. NPH: 78.2 percent, OR = 0.37), and of nocturnal
hypoglycemia (analogue: 26.2 percent vs. NPH: 44.1 percent, OR = 0.45) for type 2
diabetes. A conservative value of 30 percent risk reduction is therefore attributed to
insulin analogue. In order to have sufficient spread for statistical inference, the alter-
native incidence levels are set to 75 and 50 percent relative to NPH insulin in the DCE.
Obesity (Weight) is a major problem of type 2 diabetes patients. 80 percent suffer
from obesity according to Russell-Jones and Khan (2007). Correspondingly, Ha¨ussler
et al. (2005) found a significantly higher BMI in type 2 patients than in the overall
German population. Insulin therapy makes this problem even worse. As a side effect of
treatment with human insulin, patients gain weight, especially during the first months
of insulin therapy. The UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group (1998)
observed a 2.5 kg increase over 6 months on average; this value serves to describe the
status quo. Insulin analogue is found to mitigate weight gain (see Haak et al., 2003,
Haak et al., 2005, Hermansen and Davies, 2007, Raslova´ et al., 2007, Russell-Jones
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and Khan, 2007, Dornhorst et al., 2008, Demssie et al., 2009, Freeman, 2009, Mandosi
et al., 2009, Marre et al., 2009, Monami et al., 2009). It may even cause weight loss
of up to 1 kg (Russell-Jones, 2007, Sreenan et al., 2008, Hermansen et al., 2009, for
meta-analyses see Bush, 2007, Raskin, 2007, and Satish and Ramachandra, 2008).
The evidence allows to associate insulin analogue with a weight gain of 0 kg, while the
levels used in the DCE are + 2.5, 0, and - 1 kg, respectively.
Before every injection, human NPH insulin has to be swung (not shaken) to achieve
uniform dilution (Swing, see Table 2.1), ensuring injection of an optimal amount
of insulin. This defines the status quo. Insufficient swinging causes a risk of inject-
ing a suboptimal amount of insulin and inadequate control of blood sugar levels
(Schleser-Mohr, 2007). Insulin analogue can be injected immediately, without swinging
(Schmeisl, 2009). These two levels also appear in the DCE.
Another difference in the two types of insulin is flexibility with regard to time of
injection (Flexibility, see Table 2.1 again). Human insulin reaches its maximum effect
often after a few hours (Soran and Younis, 2006). The time of the bedtime injection
therefore is set at 10 pm to avoid insufficient insulin levels in the early morning; this
defines the status quo. Insulin analogue has a different action profile. Its maximum
effect occurs later (see Kurtzhals, 2007 and Demssie et al., 2009), allowing patients
to inject insulin already before 10 pm, usually between dinner and bedtime. However,
time of injection should not vary from day to day. Insulin analogue is therefore
described accordingly, and this attribute again has two levels in the DCE.
The last two attributes listed in Table 2.1 describe two modes of financing, individually
through copayment by diabetics themselves or collectively through increased GKV
contributions by the whole population. Inclusion of these two price attributes can be
justified for at least three reasons. First, Germany has been introducing copayment on
pharmaceuticals along with reference pricing of drugs, making it a mode of financing
of increasing importance. Second, a population may well have preferences with regard
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to modes of financing, as evidenced by Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen (2003) for the
case of Denmark. And third, economic considerations lead one to suspect that those
affected by the disease prefer financing through increased insurance contributions
(which fall on everyone) over copayment (which burdens only the affected). This
hypothesis will be tested (see H4 of Section 2.5). As to Copayment, there is none
in the status quo for diabetes patients, regardless of type of therapy (see Table 2.1).
In the alternative, the levels are Euro 50, 150, and 300 per year, respectively. As to
Contribution, respondents were asked to look up the actual amount paid to establish
an individual-specific status quo. Contributions are estimated to increase by Euro 8.54
per year and GKV member3 if insulin analogue is added to the benefit list. On average
this corresponds to an increase of 0.5 percent of annual health insurance contributions,
which is the value attributed to insulin analogue. In the DCE, levels characterizing
the alternative are set to increases of 0.5, 1, and 2 percent, respectively.
Pretest and Design
The pretest was conducted by the same market research institute and consisted of 30
face-to-face interviews with individuals from the greater Leipzig area (17 non-diabetics,
four type 2 insulin-dependent, four type 2 insulin-naive, and five type 1 patients, 23
women and 7 men, 52 years of age on average). One-third of the interviews were
monitored by the first author of this study. In general, participants and interviewers
understood the questions well. 25 individuals rated the choices ”easy” and five
”difficult”. However, no one rated them ”very difficult”. On average the new insulin
was chosen 3.8 times out of 10 choices. Econometric estimates confirmed the relevance
of attributes and levels, with one exception. In the pretest, increases in insurance
contributions were 0.25, 0.5, and 1 percent. Apparently, this range was not sufficient
to affect decisions. Therefore it was scaled up to 0.5, 1, and 2 percent. Figure 2.1
shows an example of a choice question.
3On average, extra cost of treatment with insulin analogue rather than human insulin is Euro 226
per year and diabetic. Multiplied by the number of insulin-treated diabetics in Germany (=1.9 mn.,
see Giani et al., 2004) and divided by the number of GKV members paying contributions (=50.471
mn., see Federal Ministry of Health, 2008) one obtains Euro 8.54 per year and GKV member.
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Choice Question: Would you prefer insulin-dependent diabetics to be treated with
                             the current or the new insulin?
Current Insulin New Insulin
1 Events of hypoglycemia on average 1-2 per week approx. 25% lower risk
2 Weight change during
first 6 months of therpay
3 Accuracy of dosage / preparation Before every injection No swinging 
of insulin before every injection swinging necessary necessary
4 Point in time of injection Predetermined: After 10pm Predetermined: After 10pm
(daily identical) (daily identical)
5 Additional copayment per year None 50 Euro
6 Your contribution to statutory
health insurance per year
In this situation I choose □ the current insulin □ the new insulin
+ 2.5kg weight gain
_____ Euro + 0.5%  =  +_____ Euro
+ 2.5kg weight gain
Figure 2.1: Choice question example: Fixed status quo (current insulin) vs. alternative
(new insulin)
For the main survey, a D-optimal design was constructed (Atkinson and Donev, 1992,
Street et al., 2001, Burgess and Street, 2003, and Carlsson and Martinsson, 2003), us-
ing the software GOSSET (see Kuhfeld et al., 1994 and Sloane and Hardin, 2007). Out
of the 576 possible combinations, 30 were retained in this way and divided into four
card sets. Each set consisted of eight choices between the current insulin (status quo)
and a new insulin (alternative). Consistency was tested by including weakly dominated
alternatives, which however were favored only by a few respondents. ”Expensive” al-
ternatives were chosen significantly less often than ”cheaper” ones. In total, the new
insulin was picked in 40 percent, the current insulin in 60 percent of cases. 27 individ-
uals did not alternate between the current and new insulins. Half of the respondents
stated that decisions were ”easy”, 39 percent ”difficult”, and 11 percent ”very difficult”.
2.4 Ex-ante vs. Ex-post Willingness-To-Pay
Based on random utility theory (see Luce, 1959, McFadden, 1974, Manski and Lerman,
1977, McFadden, 1981, and McFadden, 2001), DCEs are designed to investigate indi-
viduals’ preferences for (non-)marketed goods or goods that do not yet exist (Becker
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and Zweifel, 2008). In a DCE, participants are repeatedly asked to choose between
a fixed status quo and an alternative whose attributes take on different values each
time. When choosing between alternatives, a rational individual will always select the
alternative with the higher level of expected utility. Thus, neglecting the expectation
operator for simplicity, the decision-making process functions as a comparison of utility
values determined by
Uij ≡ v(aj, pj, yi, si, εij), (2.1)
where Uij represents the indirect utility value attained by individual i in alternative j.
It depends on the vector of attributes aj, the price pj, the individual’s income yi, and
socioeconomic characteristics denoted by si. Finally, εij is an error term that varies
over alternatives and individuals. Provided the error term is additive, the individual
will choose alternative k over alternative l if
u(ak, pk, yi, si) + εik ≥ u(al, pl, yi, si) + εil, (2.2)
where u(·) is the deterministic and εij the stochastic component of the utility function
v(·). The probability of choosing the alternative k over l, Pik, is assumed to equal the
probability of the difference in Equation (2.2) occurring. Solving for the difference in
error terms, one obtains
Pik = Prob[εil − εik ≤ u(ak, pk, yi, si)− u(al, pl, yi, si)]. (2.3)
For any inference about the left-hand side of inequality (2.3), a probability law for
ω=(εil− εik) must be assumed. Since the logistic distribution assumes independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), the normal distribution is used here, resulting in probit
estimation. It is assumed that errors are correlated between the choices of a given
respondent but not across respondents, calling for random effects specification. With
the utility function linear in parameters (Louviere et al., 2000), one has
∆Uik = β0 + β1a1k + β2a2k + . . .+ βLaLk + ωik, (2.4)
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with ωik=µi+νik. Here, a1k, ..., aLk are the L attributes of the alternative k in
consideration. According to Equation (2.3), only differences in utility matter. For this
reason, fixed characteristics of respondents drop out. The βs are the parameters to be
estimated.
Based on Hanemann (1983), the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two
attributes m and n is equal to the ratio of the derivatives of the indirect utility function
with respect to the two attributes,
MRS =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
=
βm
βn
. (2.5)
Defining n as a financial attribute allows interpretation of the negative of the MRS as
a marginal WTP for attribute m.
A special feature of this study is that it seeks to measure WTP of both individuals
who do not suffer from the disease or do not need insulin yet (ex-ante) and insulin-
treated diabetes patients (ex-post). Whereas the utility gained (or lost) from a change
in treatment is a real and immediate utility change for insulin-treated diabetics, it is
an expected utility for non- and insulin-naive diabetics, which can be written as
EUij = pii · Uij(Therapy|Diabetic) + (1− pii) · Uij(Therapy|Non-Diabetic), (2.6)
where pii is the individual-specific (subjective) probability to come down with insulin-
treated diabetes. For patients treated with insulin, pii is equal to 1, causing the second
term of Equation (2.6) to become zero. In this case, Equation (2.6) is equal to Uij, the
individual’s utility experienced form alternative j. When substituting the attributes de-
scribed above into Equation (2.1), and assuming linearity, utility for insulin-dependent
diabetics becomes
Uij = β0 + β1Hypoij + β2Weightij + β3Swingij + β4Flexibilityij (2.7)
+β5Copaymentij + β6Contributionij + ωij.
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For individuals not suffering from the disease and insulin-naive diabetics, pii is between
zero and one. Their expected utility function therefore reads,
EUij = pii · (β0 + β1Hypoij + β2Weightij + β3Swingij (2.8)
+β4Flexibilityij + β5Copaymentij + β6Contributionij)
+(1− pii) · (β0 + β6Contributionij) + ωij.
Recall that the variables in Equation (2.7) represent the differences between the
current and the new insulin. For example Hypoij is the probability of suffering
from hypoglycemia when treated with the current insulin minus this probability
when treated with the new insulin (NPH insulin). Consequently, the values for
Hypo, Weight, Swing, Flexibility, and Copayment are set equal to zero in case of
non-diabetics and insulin-naive patients because they do not vary across alternatives.
However, health insurance contributions do vary since if the pharmaceutical is paid
for by the GKV, every member contributes to the cost of the medications covered, not
only patients.
There are two main reasons for a non-diabetic person to derive utility from and hence
have a positive WTP for diabetes treatment, namely altruism and/or buying a call
option for better treatment in case of coming down with the disease. Starting with
the latter, the first term of Equation (2.8) shows the change in expected utility of a
person who envisages coming down with insulin-dependent diabetes and therefore has
positive WTP for a call option on new treatments. The higher the probability pii, the
higher the probability of exercising this option, and the higher WTP. With regard to
altruism, the second term of Equation (2.8) represents the change in expected utility
of a person who envisages staying healthy. In this case, β0 can be interpreted as WTP
due to altruism. Finally, Equation (2.8) can be rewritten as
EUij = β0 + piiβ1Hypoij + piiβ2Weightij + piiβ3Swingij (2.9)
+piiβ4Flexibilityij + piiβ5Copaymentij + β6Contributionij + ωij.
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This equation holds for non-diabetics as well as for diabetics. For the latter, pii equals 1 if
treated with insulin, causing Equations (2.9) and (2.7) to be identical. The calculation
of WTP has to be modified as well. If the financial attribute (n) is specified to be
copayment, Equation (2.5) holds. However, if it is GKV contributions, the probability
of becoming a diabetic has to be taken into account,
WTP = −pii · βm
β6
. (2.10)
2.5 Hypotheses
This section is devoted to the statement of hypotheses concerning WTP values.
Hypothesis H1: From the GKV members’ point of view, insulin analogue
generates an additional utility compared to human insulin.
Increases in contributions and copayment will always have a negative effect on
utility. However, this hypothesis states that the other attributes generate enough
additional utility compared to human insulin to make its total effect positive.
Hypothesis H2: WTP values for the attributes are in the following
rank order.
H2.1 Decreasing the risk of hypoglycemia has the highest WTP, fol-
lowed by avoiding weight gain.
H2.2 WTP for more flexibility with regard to time of injection is con-
siderably lower than for avoiding weight gain.
H2.3 WTP for no need to swing the preparation before injection is very
low, not significantly different from zero.
Hypoglycemia is a traumatic experience. Symptoms of hypoglycemia include shak-
iness, dizziness, confusion, and difficulty to speak, just to mention a few. Severe
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hypoglycemia can cause loss of consciousness and even death. Therefore the highest
WTP is expected for a decrease in this risk, dominating concerns about weight
gain. This is supported by Hermansen and Davies (2007), who found that patients
often take a precautionary snack to avoid hypoglycemia, accepting weight gain as
the consequence. Further supporting references are Guimara˜es et al. (2009b) (in the
context of oral and inhaled insulin delivery) and Hauber et al. (2009) (in the context
of oral glucose-lowering medications) who conclude that patients of both type 1 and
type 2 have a higher WTP for avoiding hypoglycemia than for avoiding weight gain. In
turn, avoiding weight gain is expected to generate a higher WTP than more flexibility
with regard to time of injection. Aristides et al. (2004) analyzed WTP for flexibility
in meal-time insulin injections. Whereas WTP values are significantly positive, they
are lower than for avoiding weight gain as estimated by Guimara˜es et al. (2009b) and
Hauber et al. (2009). Finally, failure to swing the preparation might be a worry for
patients at the beginning of the treatment. With increasing experience permitting
them to save time and effort, WTP for this attribute is predicted to go to zero. Recall
that diabetics participating in the DCE had been subject to the condition for six
months or more.
Hypothesis H3: There is significant heterogeneity of WTP values
between diabetics and non-diabetics and between diabetes subgroups.
The difference in experience with using insulin might be the key reason for het-
erogeneity in preferences (as found in Guimara˜es et al., 2009b). Whereas type 1
and insulin-treated type 2 diabetics have used insulin before, non-diabetics and
insulin-naive type 2 diabetics have not. For instance, they do not know what a
hypoglycemic situation feels like and how it can be handled.
Hypothesis H4: Non-affected respondents and diabetics not treated
with insulin prefer financing through patients themselves in the
guise of copayment, whereas insulin-treated patients prefer financing
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through health insurance contributions.
Both diabetics and non-diabetics are predicted to have positive WTP for in-
sulin analogue. However, WTP values of non-diabetics and insulin-naive diabetics are
expected to be higher when financing occurs through copayment by patients them-
selves than jointly by the whole population through health insurance contributions.
Conversely, WTP values of type 1 and insulin-dependent type 2 diabetics should be
higher when financing occurs jointly through health insurance contributions.
2.6 Data: Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the sample. Approximately 50 percent of the respondents
are female. Average age is higher for type 2 diabetics than for the rest of the sample
because this disease occurs primarily among the elderly (although the number of
children suffering from type 2 diabetes has been increasing substantially, see Wabitsch
et al., 2004 and Rosenbauer and Stahl, 2010). Respondents were asked to mark their
subjective health status on a visual analog scale ranging from 0 (very bad health)
to 100 (very good health). Non-diabetics reported the highest average value of 73,
insulin-treated type 2 patients the lowest of 54. On average, type 2 diabetics have
the highest BMI with 28 (insulin-treated) and 27 (insulin-naive), respectively. This
matches the findings of the UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group (1998)
stating that obesity is highly prevalent among type 2 diabetics. The difference in BMI
between type 2 and non-diabetics is statistically significant.
Average net household income is Euro 1,904 per month. Insulin-naive diabetics of type
2 have a lower income (Euro 1,783) than non-diabetics (Euro 1,975). This difference
is in accordance with Ha¨ussler et al. (2005) who found a negative correlation between
prevalence of type 2 diabetes and income. Because contributions to statutory health
insurance GKV are defined as a percentage of (labor) income, higher incomes lead to
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higher contributions. While the function is nonlinear because the percentage varies
between sick funds and regions, non-diabetics do pay higher contributions on average
than the others. Some 41 percent of them also have at least one supplementary
insurance contract, compared to 30 percent for type 1 diabetics and 31 percent for
insulin-treated diabetics. This reflects the fact that diabetics treated with insulin
present high risks to private health insurers offering supplementary coverage, causing
high premiums or exclusion clauses to be applied.
The lower part of Table 2.2 contains information about duration of illness and incidence
of diabetic complications. Type 1 diabetics on average have been suffering for 17 years
from the disease at the time of the DCE. For type 2 diabetics this value drops to 8 to 9
years. Only 18 percent of type 2 diabetes patients with insulin treatment do not suffer
from any complication. For insulin-naive type 2 diabetics, this number is 23 percent and
for type 1 diabetics, 27 percent. High blood pressure is the most common complication,
followed by diabetic neuropathy, diabetic feet, and diabetic retinopathy. Strokes, hearth
attacks, as well as amputations, are most common among type 2 diabetics with insulin
therapy.
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2.7 Empirical Results
2.7.1 Willingness-To-Pay
As a first step, it is important to know whether the attributes retained are relevant
and have the expected impacts on utility. Table 2.3 presents the estimation results
of Equation (2.9). All coefficients are highly significant and have the expected signs.
The positive value of the constant can be interpreted as follows. If the specification
of the utility function had been perfect, then the difference between the alternative
and the status quo would be entirely due to the differences in attributes. There
would be no reason to expect a constant different from zero. However, there may
be individual characteristics not accounted for that give rise to a bias in favor or
against the status quo (Salkeld et al., 2000). In the present case, the positive constant
points to a preference in favor of the alternative and hence a bias against the status quo.
Using Equations (2.5) and (2.10), marginal WTP values depending on the mode of fi-
nancing (copayment and increase in contributions, respectively) can be estimated. The
upper part of Table 2.4 shows the results for copayment, the lower, for contributions.
According to Equation (2.10) WTP values for the latter must be probability-weighted
Table 2.3: Results of a random-effects probit estimation, aggregate sample
Attribute Expected sign Coefficient z-value Marginal effect
Constant 0.7632 15.77
Hypoglycemia1 + 0.0065 14.07 0.002
Weight2 + 0.1380 13.27 0.051
Swing3 ± 0.2947 8.41 0.108
Flexibility3 + 0.1704 4.94 0.063
Copayment – −0.0055 −39.97 −0.002
Contribution – −0.0047 −5.23 −0.002
σµ 0.51 19.93
ρ 0.20 12.53
1: Decrease of the risk of hypoglycemia
2: Avoiding weight gain
3: Dummy-variable, 0 = status quo, 1 = alternative
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for deriving estimates that apply to GKV members in general, who would pay
increased contributions. Estimates weighted by the average subjective probability of
coming down with insulin-treated diabetes are displayed in the last two columns of
Table 2.4. Subjective probabilities (pii) were measured in the questionnaire using a
visual analog scale from 0 percent (will never become insulin-treated diabetic) to 100
percent (will become insulin-treated diabetic with certainty). For diabetics already
treated with insulin, pii is equal to 1. The average value over all respondents (p¯i) is 53
percent.
For both modes, preference for the alternative is very high, viz. Euro 262 and Euro
162 per year. In most DCEs, status quo bias is negative, indicating resistance against
change (see e.g. Telser and Zweifel, 2002 and Zweifel et al., 2006). In the case of
diabetes treatment, respondents seem to be willing to pay for a shift away from the
status quo.
As to the risk of hypoglycemia, respondents are willing to pay an estimated Euro 1.19
per year for a 1 percentage point reduction through copayment and Euro 1.39 through
contributions. The second amount decreases to Euro 0.74 per year when weighted
by average probability p¯i (see lower part of Table 2.4). To avoid 1 kg of weight gain,
respondents are willing to pay Euro 25 through copayment or Euro 16 through higher
yearly contributions, respectively.
To compare the importance of the attributes, consider a 100 percent change. Although
unrealistic in the case of hypoglycemia, it allows to compare WTP directly with
the (0,1) attributes. For the risk of hypoglycemia, a 100 percent decrease has an
approximate WTP of Euro 119 (copayment) and Euro 74 (contribution), respectively.
For fully avoiding the average weight gain of 2.5 kg (see Section 2.3), which also
amounts to a 100 percent change, the WTP value is Euro 63 (= 2.5 · 25.15, copayment)
and Euro 39 (= 2.5 · 15.55, contribution). Hence, regardless of mode of financing,
respondents value lowering the risk of hypoglycemia two times more than avoiding
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weight gain, corroborating H2.1. As to WTP for increased flexibility with regard to
the timing of the injection, the values amount to Euro 31 (copayment) and Euro
19 (contribution), respectively. This is much less than the Euro 63 and Euro 39 for
avoiding weight gain, in accordance with H2.2.
The possibility to inject insulin without swinging before every injection is worth Euro
54 (copayment) or Euro 33 per year (contribution), respectively. Since these values
differ from zero, they constitute evidence against H2.3. A seemingly minor innovation
(from the medical point of view) is clearly valued by consumers. However, it is valued
less than avoidance of either hypoglycemia or weight gain. For instance, the difference
between Euro 119 (100 percent change in hypoglycemia, copayment) and Euro 54
(swing, copayment) has statistical significance in view of the small standard errors.
Table 2.4: Marginal WTP for product attributes, aggregate sample, Euro
Attribute MWTP Standard error z-value MWTP · p¯i∗
Delta Method4 Bootstrap5
Financing through copayment
Constant 261.50 8.54 9.11 30.62
Hypoglycemia1 1.19 0.09 0.10 13.48
Weight2 25.15 1.90 2.19 13.23
Swing3 53.69 6.34 6.31 8.47
Flexibility3 31.04 6.29 6.37 4.94
Financing through health insurance contribution
Constant 161.75 29.20 41.11 5.54 161.75
Hypoglycemia1 1.39 0.28 0.40 4.87 0.74
Weight2 29.25 5.79 8.80 5.05 15.55
Swing3 62.46 13.87 18.48 4.50 33.21
Flexibility3 36.11 10.20 13.31 3.54 19.20
∗ Except constant
1: Decrease of the risk of hypoglycemia by 1 percentage point
2: Avoiding weight gain
3: Dummy variable, 0 = status quo, 1 = alternative
4: Standard errors calculated using the delta method
5: Standard errors calculated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications
Note: All marginal WTP (MWTP) values are in Euro per year, Euro 1 ≈ USD 1.4 at 2008 exchange
rates
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To test H1 (positive value of the new pharmaceutical) total WTP values need to be
calculated. As described in Section 2.3, insulin analogue corresponds to the following
changes in attributes. Risk of hypoglycemia decreases by 30 percent in comparison to
treatment with human insulin NPH. Whereas patients gain 2.5 kg on average with
human insulin, there is no weight change with insulin analogue. The preparation does
not need to be swung, and the timing of injection is more flexible. Following Hanemann
(1983), WTP associated with these non-marginal changes is computed as the marginal
WTP multiplied by the change of the attribute’s value. These component values are
then summed up to obtain total WTP for the product (see Johnson and Desvousges,
1997). The results of these calculations are shown in Table 2.5. Total WTP for the
new drug amounts to Euro 445 per year if financed through copayment and Euro 275
(probability-weighted) if financed through an increase in contributions. Approximately
60 percent of this WTP comes from bias in favor of the alternative. Even if this com-
ponent is subtracted, the resulting values of Euro 183 and Euro 114, respectively, are
still significantly positive in view of the small estimated standard errors displayed in
Table 2.5. Therefore, H1 is confirmed.
Table 2.5: WTP for product attributes, aggregate sample, Euro
Financing through copayment Financing through contribution
Attribute WTP z-value WTP · p¯i∗ z-value
Constant 261.50 16.29 161.75 5.54
Hypoglycemia1 35.74 13.48 22.20 4.87
Weight2 62.87 13.23 38.88 5.05
Swing3 53.69 8.47 33.21 4.50
Flexibility3 31.04 4.94 19.20 3.54
Total 444.84 275.24
Total net of constant 183.34 113.49
∗ Except constant
1: Decrease of the risk of hypoglycemia by 30 percent
2: Avoiding a 2.5 kg weight gain
3: Dummy variable, 0 = status quo, 1 = alternative
Note: All WTP are in Euro per year, Euro 1 ≈ USD 1.4 at 2008 exchange rates
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2.7.2 Willingness-To-Pay across Subgroups
To obtain group-specific WTP values, Equation (2.9) is estimated separately for
non-diabetics, type 1 diabetics, type 2 insulin-naive as well as for insulin-treated
diabetics. Group-specific MWTP values (not shown) are multiplied by the changes in
attribute levels due to insulin analogue and summed, in full analogy to Table 2.5. The
subjective probability of acquiring insulin-treated diabetes is 26 percent on average
for non-diabetics and 56 percent for insulin-naive patients. The resulting non-marginal
WTP values across subgroups are presented in Table 2.6. Sum I comprises all
component WTP values, Sum II only the significant ones. Standard errors (z-values
shown) are small enough to conclude that there is preference heterogeneity between
these four groups, confirming H3.
Moreover, comparison of the upper and the lower part of Table 2.6 shows that the
mode of payment matters, but not entirely in the way predicted by H4. As stated by
H4, WTP values among diabetics should be higher when the new pharmaceutical is
financed through increased GKV contributions rather than copayment, while among
the non-affected, it should be the other way round. Now non-diabetics indeed exhibit
a higher total WTP value when financing is through copayment. They are joined by
the insulin-naive diabetics who apparently deem themselves not to be affected. On
the other hand, type 1 diabetics do have higher WTP when financing occurs through
increased contributions, but the difference is not statistically significant. For insulin-
treated type 2 diabetics, the ordering is as expected at first sight (Sum I). Their WTP
is extremely high when they envisage financing through increased contributions rather
than copayment. However, not a single component value is significantly different from
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zero, causing Sum II to be zero as well. Apparently, opinions concerning insulin
analogue are very divided among these patients as soon as it were to be paid for by
increased contributions.
The high WTP values estimated for non-diabetics in the case of copayment also merit
discussion. It is doubtful that they would be verified in a real purchase decision.
Rather, being importantly due to a high constant, they point to a strong bias in favor
of the alternative - provided those affected pay for the new drug themselves.
Finally, the entries of Table 2.6 can also be interpreted in the following way. The high
copayment-related WTP values of non-diabetics and insulin-naive diabetics suggest
that they prefer financing through patients themselves. Conversely, insulin-treated
patients prefer financing jointly through health insurance contributions. However,
whatever the group considered and regardless of mode of payment, WTP for insulin
analogue measured by Sum I exceeds its cost of treatment (estimated at Euro 226
per year). If measured by Sum II, this is also true, with the only exception of type
2 insulin-treated patients whose preferences are too heterogeneous. Therefore, by a
benefit-cost criterion, including this product in the GKV list of benefits appears to be
justified.
2.8 Conclusions
This study revolves around the issue of whether a particular new pharmaceutical
should be included in the benefit list of a social health insurer. From a cost-benefit
perspective and neglecting distributional concerns, inclusion is justified if the insured
have a willingness-to-pay (WTP) that exceeds the cost of treatment with the new
product. The case in question is modern insulin therapy, using the long-acting insulin
analogue ”Insulin detemir”. Preferences for this preparation in comparison to conven-
tional therapy (using human insulin) are derived with the help of a discrete-choice
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experiment. It involved 1,110 members of German statutory health insurance (GKV)
in 2007, of whom 202 suffer from type 1 diabetes, 154 from type 2 diabetes treated
with insulin, 152 are insulin-naive type 2 diabetics, and 602 are non-diabetics. The
novelty of the experiment lies in two aspects. First, distinguishing these groups allows
to estimate both ex-ante WTP for non-diabetics and naive diabetics and ex-post WTP
for diabetic patients treated with insulin. Second, including the mode of payment
(copayment vs. increased GKV contribution) permits to test whether the new drug
has a favorable benefit-cost ratio regardless of the way it is financed. Based on the
results reported, four research questions can be answered.
(1) Is there positive WTP for the long-acting insulin analogue? The evidence suggests
there is, compared to the conventional therapy using long-acting human insulin NPH
(Table 2.5). Components of this total value are WTP for reduction of the risk of
hypoglycemia by 30 percent, no weight gain rather than 2.5 kg during the first six
months of the therapy, relief from the need to swing the preparation before each
injection, and flexibility with regard to the timing of the injection.
(2) Which product attributes contribute to total WTP? All product attributes have
positive estimated WTP values. For comparison purposes, a hypothetical 100 percent
reduction of the risk of hypoglycemia and of the weight gain are considered because
the other attributes are (0,1) variables. In accordance with expectations, the maximum
WTP value comes from risk reduction with respect to hypoglycemia, followed by
avoiding weight gain. The other attributes are less highly valued.
(3) Is there preference heterogeneity across morbidity groups, viz. non-diabetics,
type 1 diabetics, insulin-treated type 2 diabetics, and insulin-naive type 2 diabetics?
Estimates do point to heterogeneity. Total WTP values differ significantly between
subgroups. Non-affected insulin-naive type 2 and non-diabetics have similar prefer-
ences, as do affected type 1 and insulin-treated type 2 diabetics.
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(4) Is the benefit-cost ratio of the new pharmaceutical favorable regardless of whether
it is financed jointly through increased GKV contributions or by patients themselves
through copayment? The evidence suggests this to be the case, with the one excep-
tion of type 2 insulin-treated diabetics, whose WTP values are very high but lack
statistical significance. Also, whereas non-diabetics and insulin-naive diabetics exhibit
higher WTP values if financing is through copayment, insulin-treated diabetics have
higher values if financing is through insurance contributions. This can be interpreted
as a preference for financing through copayment on the part of the non-affected
non-diabetics and insulin-naive diabetics and through insurance of the part of the
affected insulin-treated diabetics. However, since even non-diabetics’ WTP is higher
than the actual treatment cost of insulin analogue regardless of mode of payment, its
inclusion in the German statutory health insurance GKV list of benefits can be justified.
These conclusions are subject to a number of reservations. First, the WTP estimates
may be biased upward because participants in the experiment may not be repre-
sentative of the GKV population. Indeed, the average net household income in the
sample is below average, which may result in a general dissatisfaction with the status
quo. This might drive up WTP for alternative treatment of diabetes as well. Second,
in spite of differentiating between disease-specific groups, there still may be hidden
heterogeneity that could correlate with error terms, causing bias in estimates. Finally,
one may judge the cost-benefit standard adopted here as inappropriate. On the one
hand, benefits should be measured in terms of quality adjusted life years rather
than money according to some writers (see e.g. Culyer, 1990, Williams and Cookson,
2000, or Drummond et al., 2005). On the other hand, average WTP values neglect
distributional issues.
While these concerns may well be valid, they are unlikely to overthrow the major
findings of this study. First, there is clear evidence suggesting that not only the
avoidance of hypoglycemia and weight gain but also attributes that typically are
judged medically irrelevant such as no need for preparation (swinging) and flexibility
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with regard to the timing of the injection are valued attributes of insulin therapy.
In addition, these attributes have positive WTP values among diabetes patients and
potential patients alike. Second, these valuations add up to total amounts that exceed
the marginal cost of the new drug, with the only exception of type 2 insulin-treated
diabetics whose WTP estimates, while sizable, cannot be distinguished from zero due
to excess heterogeneity. It is difficult to conceive of biases so strong and distributional
weightings so skewed to conclude that WTP values of GKV members likely fail to
justify inclusion of this new pharmaceutical in the benefit list.
Disclaimer
This study was paid for by Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH. However, the authors inde-
pendently designed the experiment, and analyzed and interpreted the results without
any influence from the sponsor. The market research institute was selected and paid
for by the authors and delivered the data directly to them.
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3 Why the Linear Utility Function is a Risky Choice
in Discrete-Choice Experiments
3.1 Introduction
Discrete-choice experiments (DCEs) enjoy great popularity with the number of applied
studies increasing steadily and penetrating every branch of the health-economic field
(see Louviere and Lancsar, 2009). Methods of DCEs are also improving. Improvements
in designs, attribute choice, and questionnaire methods have all recently emerged. For
example, Green and Gerard (2009) were the first to implement cost-effectiveness of
alternatives in the attributes. At the same time, more complex estimation procedures
are being used. Whereas logit or probit estimations are most commonly applied,
random coefficient models (also called mixed logits) are becoming more frequently
used (Regier et al., 2009).
One component of DCEs that remains unchanged during this process of improvement:
The form of the utility function. Almost all studies refer to Louviere et al. (2000), who
stated that a linear specification in linear models typically accounts for 70 to 90 percent
of explained variance. Consequently, most authors choose a main effects design and as-
sume that all interactions are equal to zero (Amaya-Amaya et al., 2008, for an example,
see Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen, 2003). Interactions are then implemented rather ad
hoc, or in the guise of interactions with socioeconomic characteristics (see for example
Gerard et al., 2008). However, it can be argued that the utility function is unlikely to be
linear because of diminishing marginal utility and gain-loss asymmetries (Hoyos, 2010).
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So far, there have only been small attempts in the DCE literature toward a non-linear
specification. Ryan and Watson (2008) note that, at the design stage, the researcher
should consider the form of the utility function, taking account of potential non-
linearities. However, they then proceed only estimating main effects, with interactions
and higher-order terms assumed as negligible with the justification to be consistent
with most DCE applications. Lancsar and Louviere (2006) outline difficulties with
assuming linear utility functions. Because tests for dominance and lexicographic pref-
erences rely on this assumption to hold, respondents previously labeled as ”irrational”
may simply appear to be so due to the specification, but are in fact not. A number
of studies go further by allowing for interactions. Linearity assumptions of particular
attributes were tested using a Wald or a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test (as for example
Telser and Zweifel, 2002).
Among econometricians, there is an ongoing methodological debate about model
specification, but so far there is no ”best” way of finding a correct model. As Kennedy
(2003) notes, however, the debate has given birth to the general principle that eco-
nomic theory should be the foundation of the model. Simultaneously, the data should
help create a ”more informed” economic theory by using econometric misspecification
tests. However, to the knowledge of the author, this way of specification has not been
applied yet to DCEs.
This paper sheds some light on this issue by showing that the linear utility function
can be a risky choice in DCEs. For this purpose, a DCE conducted by Becker (2006,
Chapters 6-8) in Switzerland is reexamined. The experiment elicits willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for debated options in Swiss mandatory social health insurance. The DCE
is evaluated in two ways. First, the utility function is assumed to be linear in the
attributes; second, a non-linear utility function is used, employing econometric
misspecification tests (as outlined by Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The results are
compared in terms of goodness-of-fit and estimated WTP. The findings suggest that
not only the non-linear function outperforms the linear specification with regard to
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goodness-of-fit, but also generates significantly different WTP. The results conclude
that the form of the utility function may have significant impact on estimated WTP.
In order to produce unbiased estimates of preferences, the specification of the utility
function should be given more attention in future experiments.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the theo-
retical foundations of DCEs, model specification, and assessing goodness-of-fit. Section
3.3 introduces the experiment, and outlines the attributes and the interview strategy.
Section 3.4 presents the empirical results with regard to the specification of the utility
function and comparison of goodness-of-fit and WTP. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Foundations
3.2.1 Discrete-Choice Experiments
Based on random utility theory (see Luce, 1959, McFadden, 1974, Manski and Lerman,
1977, McFadden, 1981, and McFadden, 2001), DCEs are designed to investigate indi-
viduals’ preferences for (non-)marketed goods or goods that do not yet exist (Becker
and Zweifel, 2008). In a DCE, participants are repeatedly asked to choose between
a fixed status quo and an alternative whose attributes take on different values each
time. When choosing between alternatives, a rational individual will always select the
alternative with the higher level of expected utility. Thus, neglecting the expectation
operator for simplicity, the decision-making process functions as a comparison of utility
values determined by
Uij ≡ v(aj, pj, yi, si, εij), (3.1)
where Uij represents the indirect utility value attained by individual i in alternative j.
It depends on the vector of attributes aj, the price pj, the individual’s income yi, and
socioeconomic characteristics denoted by si. Finally, εij is an error term that varies
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over alternatives and individuals. Provided the error term is additive, the individual
will choose alternative k over alternative l if
u(ak, pk, yi, si) + εik ≥ u(al, pl, yi, si) + εil, (3.2)
where u(·) is the deterministic and εij the stochastic component of the utility function
v(·). The probability of choosing the alternative k over l, Pik, is assumed to equal the
probability of the difference in Equation (3.2) occurring. Solving for the difference in
error terms, one obtains
Pik = Prob[εil − εik ≤ u(ak, pk, yi, si)− u(al, pl, yi, si)]. (3.3)
For any inference about the left-hand side of Inequality (3.3), a probability law for
ω=(εil− εik) must be assumed. Since the logistic distribution assumes independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), the normal distribution is used here, resulting in probit
estimation. It is assumed that errors are correlated between the choices of a given
respondent but not across respondents, calling for random effects specification. With
the utility function linear in parameters (Louviere et al., 2000), one has
∆Uik = β0 + β1a1k + β2a2k + . . .+ βLaLk + ωik, (3.4)
with ωik=µi+νik. Here, a1k, ..., aLk are the L attributes of the alternative k in
consideration. According to Equation (3.3), only differences in utility matter. For this
reason, fixed characteristics of respondents drop out. The βs are the parameters to be
estimated. With a non-linear utility function, interactions and higher-order terms of
the attributes are also in Equation (3.4).
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Based on Hanemann (1983), the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two
attributes m and n is equal to the ratio of the derivatives of the indirect utility function
with respect to the two attributes. In the case of a linear utility function this is
MRS =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
=
βm
βn
. (3.5)
Defining n as a financial attribute allows interpretation of the negative of the MRS
as a marginal WTP for attribute m. With a non-linear utility function, the MRS is
no longer constant and can only be stated subject to the given values of the other
attributes.
3.2.2 Specification of the Utility Function
As outlined in the introduction, economic theory should form the foundation of the
utility function’s specification. Indeed, misspecification tests from the econometrics
and statistics literature should help to create the model. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000,
Chapter 4) provide an overview of these methods and present a strategy for binary
response models. In the following, their 5-step procedure is summarized with regard
to DCEs. Steps 1, 2, and 5 concern the issue of choosing variables that belong in
the utility function. If too many variables are included, the problem of over-fitting
arises, typically characterized by unrealistically large estimates of coefficients and/or
standard errors (see Harrell et al., 1996). If an insufficient number of variables is
included or variables that do not belong into the model are used, the generated
predictions are also poor. Steps 3 and 4 concern the issue of choosing the attributes’
functional form.
Step 1: As a first step, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) propose a careful univariate
analysis of each of the possible covariates for the model. In the case of DCEs, these are
the attributes. Contingency tables, smoothed scatter plots, and LR tests are some of
the instruments that can be used. After the researcher determines a general impression
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of the relations between the dependent variable (0 if the respondent decides in favor
of the status quo, 1 if in favor of the alternative) and the independent variables (the
attributes), a stepwise method may be applied to decide which attributes should be
considered. It can either be a forward selection with a test of backward elimination
or a backward elimination followed by a test for forward selection. According to
Mickey and Greenland (1989), the significance level of entry into the model should
not be equal to the traditional values (such as 0.05) because important variables
could be excluded mistakenly. They recommend using a value between 0.15 and 0.25.
However, most DCEs are designed and pretested in such a way that all attributes are
important. Nevertheless, attributes can still find their way into the utility function
despite insignificance if they are important for answering the research questions.
Step 2: The second step is to verify all the attributes that survived the selection
procedure of Step 1. This should first include a Wald statistic for each variable.
Attributes that do not contribute to the model are then excluded and the new model
is compared to the former using an LR test. Estimated coefficients should also be
compared when excluding an attribute. If they change markedly in magnitude, this
indicates that the excluded variable was important for providing an adjustment of the
effect of the attributes remaining in the model.
Step 3: Now that all attributes are verified, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) suggest
exploring the scales of the continuous covariates. As a starting point, it is assumed
that the utility function is linear in the attributes. There are different methods to
ascertain this assumption, three of which follow. (1) A univariate smoothed scatter
plot (Cleveland, 1979 and Cleveland and Devlin, 1988) shows potential non-linearities
in the data and can easily be performed using statistical packages. (2) Four dummy
variables (”design variables”) are generated for the quartiles of the attribute. These are
regressed together with the other attributes (but without the attribute in consideration
and the first quartile’s dummy) on the dependent variable. The quartiles’ means are
plotted against the estimated coefficients of the dummies. For the first quartile, the
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coefficient is set to zero. The shape of this curve shows whether the linear specification
might be appropriate. (3) The modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test (see Section 3.2.3
below), which can be applied for each variable separately. If this test fails, the linear
specification is probably incorrect.
Step 4: In principle, the utility function needs to be as rich as the data requires,
including the possibilities of interactions of higher order. However, all possible
interactions should not be done in a model with many attributes, because this implies
a very high-order regression. Consequently, the fourth step is to assess the need to
include interaction terms. All possible interactions are tested using LR tests. To verify
the results of Step 3, the terms in squares and other higher orders that resulted from
Step 3 are tested as well.
Step 5: As a last step, in addition to assessing goodness-of-fit of the specified utility
function, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) propose to backwardly select for more
parsimony. However, the final backward selection has to carefully consider the fit of
the model. If too many interactions and higher-order terms are dismissed, the utility
function may no longer pass the goodness-of-fit tests.
3.2.3 Assessing Goodness-of-Fit
To decide which utility function is ”better”, linear or non-linear, a variety of goodness-
of-fit measures are available. These include the LR test, the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and the log-likelihood. However,
the following tests for misspecification can also be used, as proposed by Basu et al.
(2004) and Basu et al. (2006).
• Pregibon’s Link test (see Pregibon, 1980 and Pregibon, 1981): This is a par-
simonious test for non-linearity. Based on the initial estimate of the regression
coefficients, a prediction of the dependent variable is generated. The prediction
and the prediction squared are included as the only covariates in a second version
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of the model. If the specification is truly linear, then the coefficient of the squared
term should not be significantly different from zero.
• Ramsey’s Reset test (see Ramsey, 1969): The Reset test allows for a richer form
of model failure than the Link test. By including not only the prediction and
the prediction squared but also the cube and prediction to the power of four, it
allows for an s-shaped misfit compared to only a quadratic misfit with the Link
test.
• Copas test (see Copas, 1983): This is a split-sample, cross-validation test for over-
fitting the data. The sample is randomly divided into estimation data and test
data. From a regression using the first sample, the predicted values are saved.
These are used as the only covariate in a regression with the test data set. If the
coefficient of the predictions is significantly different from one, over-fitting is a
problem.
• Modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000): By observing
the pattern in the residuals of the estimation as a function of the predicted
values, this test determines whether there is a systematic bias. The modified
Hosmer-Lemeshow test regresses the residuals on dummies for the deciles1 of the
predicted values. An F-test shows if the dummies have a significant influence
on the residuals. If so, there is a non-linearity in the underlying data that is
not represented in the model. The pattern of the regression coefficients and their
standard errors allow a conclusion about the appropriate non-linear specification.
• Regular Hosmer-Lemeshow test (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1980): As with the
modified version, the predicted values are grouped into ten equal sized groups. A
Pearson-χ2-statistic compares the observed and estimated expected frequencies
and points out possible lacks of fit.
1Depending on the size of the data set, the test can be performed with more than ten groups.
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• Pearson correlation: A Pearson correlation significantly different from zero be-
tween the residuals and the predicted values indicates that the model’s predic-
tions are biased.
3.3 The Experiment
3.3.1 Background: Swiss Statutory Social Health Insurance
The DCE assesses preferences for Swiss statutory health insurance and WTP for
proposed reforms. It was conducted by Becker (2006, Chapters 6-8) in 2003.2 Switzer-
land is a country of interest because its health insurance combines mandatory and
choice elements in a way similar to the US and the Netherlands (OECD, 2004). The
Health Insurance Law (KVG), effective since 1996, obliges all permanent residents of
Switzerland to purchase health insurance policies for basic coverage. The law defines
a uniform basic package of health care benefits that has become more comprehensive
over the years, mostly driven by technological progress and new treatment methods.
For a new therapy or pharmaceutical product to be included in the benefit package,
its effectiveness, efficacy, and economic efficiency have to be proven (Article 32 Health
Insurance Law KVG). Premiums are community-rated and not tax-financed, i.e. all
insured pay approximately the same independent of age and morbidity. In addition,
there is a fixed rate of copayment, amounting to 10 percent of health care expenditures
with a maximum of CHF 600 per year (CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.82 at 2005 exchange rates).3
Complementing these mandatory elements, there are elements of choice. There is
free choice of health insurer. Contrary to the US, employers are not involved in this
decision. Insurers are obliged by law to accept any applicant (for mandatory insurance,
but not for supplementary health insurance). When it comes to choice of contract,
there are two main elements. The first choice is the level of annual deductible. It ranges
from a minimum of CHF 300 to a maximum of CHF 1,500.4 The second involves
2See also Becker and Zweifel, 2008
3The maximum was increased to CHF 700 per year in 2004.
4This range was effective until 01.01.2005, when the maximum was increased to CHF 2,500 per
year.
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choosing between the conventional and Managed Care (MC) options. In the standard
case, the choice of the provider is not restricted. In the MC settings, alternatives
are offered. These include physician networks (similar to Independent Provider
Associations in the US), restricted lists of physicians (Preferred Provider Organiza-
tions) and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). For MC options, insurers are
allowed to give reductions in premiums up to a certain percentage. However, the basic
package of benefits remains the same, independent of the deductible and model chosen.
3.3.2 Attributes
The DCE’s attributes represent different aspects of health insurance contracts within
the context of Swiss health insurance (see Table 3.1). The importance of the attributes
was secured by discussions with various experts from the Swiss health care system.
Further data comes from a survey conducted by the Swiss Society of Applied Social
Research (GFS, 2001). The first attribute of interest is reimbursement of alternative
Table 3.1: DCE attributes, labels and levels
Alternative medicine Status quo: Some alternative treatments are covered
(Alternative) Alternative: More alternative treatments are covered
Pharmaceuticals Status quo: All pharmaceuticals on the list of benefits
(Generics) are reimbursed
Alternative: Only the cheapest product is reimbursed
Access to treatment methods Status quo: Coverage as soon as approved
(Wait Innovation) Alternative: Coverage only two years after approval
Copayment per year Status quo: 10 percent with a max. of CHF 600
(Copayment) Alternative: 20 percent with a max. of CHF 1,200
Deductible per year Status quo: CHF 230, 400, 600, 1,200, 1,500
(Deductible) Alternatives: CHF 0, 2,400, 4,800
Health insurance contribution Status quo: Individual contribution
per month (Contribution) Alternatives: CHF –50, –25, –10, +10, +25, +50
Note: CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.82 at 2005 exchange rates
Why the Linear Utility Function is a Risky Choice in Discrete-Choice Experiments 53
medicine (Alternative). In the status quo insurance contract, acupuncture, traditional
Chinese medicine, anthroposophic medicine, homeopathy, neural therapy, and phy-
totherapy are part of the benefit package. The alternative suggests more treatments be
reimbursed, such as treatments of alternative practitioners and naturopathy. The sec-
ond attribute is reimbursement of pharmaceuticals (Generics). Whereas in the status
quo insurance contract, where all pharmaceuticals on the list of benefits are reimbursed,
the alternative offers only the cheapest product (the generics) to be paid by the health
insurer. Another constraint is access to treatment methods (Wait Innovation). While in
the status quo contract, access is guaranteed to all insured immediately after approval,
the alternative allows coverage only after 2 years. Two issues of great interest in the
ongoing reform debate are consumers’ willingness-to-accept copayment (Copayment)
and deductibles (Deductible). With a copayment rate of 10 percent and a maximum
payment of CHF 600 per year, the status quo’s copayment rate is lower than the alter-
native’s, which offers a 20 percent rate and a maximum of CHF 1,200 per year. For the
deductible, there are five options, ranging from CHF 230 up to CHF 1,500 per year.
The alternatives offer a wider range, starting from no deductible at all to CHF 4,800
per year. The sixth attribute is health insurance contributions (Contribution). The
amount of contribution varies by increases and decreases of up to CHF 50 per month
in the alternatives.
3.3.3 Pretest and Design
These and other attributes were checked for relevance in a pretest conducted with 20
individuals. The respondents understood the survey well and did not find the DCE
section difficult. However, an adjustment had to be made with the deductible. While
the levels for the alternative were CHF 3,000 and CHF 6,000 in the pretest, these were
lowered to CHF 2,400 and CHF 4,800 to avoid protest response for lack of realism.
For the main survey, the number of possible scenarios was reduced from a full factorial
design to a fractional factorial D-optimal design (see Atkinson and Donev, 1992, Street
et al., 2001, Burgess and Street, 2003, and Carlsson and Martinsson, 2003) of 27 choice
sets using the program GOSSET (see Kuhfeld et al., 1994 and Sloane and Hardin,
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Choice Question: Which insurance contract do you prefer?
Current Contract New Contract
1 Reimbursement alternative Some methods More methods
medicine are covered are covered
2 Reimbursement pharmaceuticals All pharmaceuticals Only the cheapest
are covered product
3 Access to new treatment methods Coverage as soon Coverage as soon
as aprooved as aprooved
4 Copayment per year 10 % with a 20 % with a
max. of 600 CHF max. of 1,200 CHF
5 Your deductible per year _____ CHF 1,500 CHF
6 Your contribution to statutory
health insurance per month
In this situation I choose □ the current contract □ the new contract
_____ CHF - 25 CHF
Figure 3.1: Choice question example: Fixed status quo (current contract) vs. alternative
(new contract)
2007). Because the intention was to assess interactions and higher-order terms, all
possible interactions and higher-order terms up to the power of five were implemented
in the design. The 27 choice sets were split randomly into three groups of nine choices
each. One choice was included twice in each choice set for consistency checking (Ryan
and Bate, 2001), resulting in ten choices per person. In each choice set, the respondents
are presented with their (constant) individual status quo and one alternative. Figure
3.1 shows an example. To avoid learning or fatigue effects, the order of the choice
alternatives was randomly changed (Kjaer et al., 2006). Some 60 percent of respondents
deviated from their status quo at least once. This means that around 40 percent of
respondents never chose the alternative insurance contract. In total, 18 percent of the
decisions were made in favor of the alternative. As for the consistency test, the choice
included twice was ”incorrectly” chosen by only 13 of 1,000 respondents. Overall, the
observed choices are plausible. Respondents tend to opt for the objectively ”good”
alternatives and to reject the ”bad” alternatives among the ten choices given.
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3.3.4 Sample and Interview Strategy
The survey was conducted in Summer 2003 and consisted of 1,000 telephone interviews.
Participants were chosen as representative with respect to age, gender, language (the
German and the French speaking parts of Switzerland), education, professional status,
and rural or urban residence. The survey contained two steps. After individuals agreed
to participate, they were asked to look up their personal monthly contributions and
their annual deductible to their insurance plan. This guarantees the respondents’
knowledge of the status quo, which is essential for making an informed choice between
the current contract and a proposed alternative. The participants were also sent an
information package, containing descriptions of the attributes. The second step was
the DCE itself. Participants were asked to compare the fixed status quo against a
hypothetical alternative defined by the attributes mentioned above. The procedure
was replicated ten times. Other questions concerned utilization of health care services,
preferences for new elements in the insurance package, and socioeconomic characteris-
tics such as age, gender, household income, and education.
Table 3.2: Selected descriptive statistics
Variable Sample Official∗ Variable Sample Official∗
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N 1,000 Supplementary insurance (%)
Average age 49 51 - alternative medicine 42
- free choice of hospital 39
Annual deductible (%) - outpatient treatment 24
- CHF 230 36 42 - inpatient treatment 21 20
- CHF 400 22 22 (semi-private option)
- CHF 600 14 10 - insurance coverage abroad 18
- CHF 1,200 02 03 - inpatient treatment 11 09
- CHF 1,500 25 15 (private option)
- dental treatment 11
Average monthly contribution (CHF)
240 280
Note: ∗ Swiss Population 2003. Source: Federal Office of Public Health (2005); CHF 1 ≈
USD 0.82 at 2005 exchange rates
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Table 3.2 shows selected descriptive statistics. Individuals with a low deductible
are somewhat underrepresented and individuals with a high deductible are over-
represented. On the whole, however, the distribution of the annual deductible is
representative when compared with official data (columns (2) and (4)). Since one
attribute of interest is coverage of alternative treatment methods, supplementary
health insurance is presented as well. 42 percent of the interviewed individuals
buy insurance for alternative medicine treatments, making this the most popular
supplementary health insurance. Another important dimension is additional coverage
of inpatient treatment. 21 percent of individuals have semi-private and 11 percent
private accommodation covered by hospital supplementary insurance. In statutory
health insurance, basic inpatient services are covered only in hospitals located in the
canton of residence. 39 percent of those interviewed buy insurance for free choice of
hospitals in all Swiss cantons. The average monthly contributions are CHF 240 in
the sample and CHF 280 in official statistics. The discrepancies are explained by
three reasons. First, the official statistics include only the (expensive) contracts with
the lowest deductible, whereas the sample also includes (less expensive) contracts
with higher deductibles and MC alternatives. Second, the canton Ticino, which has
traditionally high health care expenditure and also high premiums, is not included
in this sample. Third, the official figure includes contributions to accident insurance,
which were excluded here.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Specification of the Utility Function
To compare the linear with a non-linear utility function, the non-linearities have to
be specified first. Using the data from the DCE presented above, the procedure by
Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) is performed step-by-step as outlined in Section 3.2.2.
The results can be summarized as follows.
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Step 1: After a univariate analysis of each attribute (not shown here), a forward
selection probit estimation with a test of backward elimination is performed. The
significance level of entry is set at 0.25 and the level to remove at 0.2. All attributes
are approved to belong in the utility function.
Step 2: The multivariate model is estimated and each attribute is then tested according
to Step 2 in Section 3.2.2. All attributes prove significance.
Step 3: Method (1): For the continuous variables Deductible and Contribution, a
smoothed univariate scatter plot is estimated (see Figure 3.2). Smoothing is performed
with the locally weighted regression command ”lowess” in Stata 10.1. Neither attribute
bears a linear relation with the dependent variable. The plot for Deductible suggests
adding a quadratic term. The plot for Contribution is non-linear, too. This may call
for a cubic term. However, as the result is not conclusive, comparison with results of
further steps is required.
Method (2): Figure 3.3 shows the results of the second method to explore the
scale of continuous variables by ”design variables” (see Step 3 in Section 3.2.2).
(a) Deductible (b) Health Insurance Contribution
Figure 3.2: Smoothed scatter plots for Deductible and Contribution
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The quartiles’ midpoints of Deductible and Contribution, respectively, are plotted
against the estimated probit regression coefficients of the dependent variable (0 if the
respondent opted for the status quo, 1 otherwise) on all attributes, with Deductible
and Contribution, respectively, substituted by dummy variables for the quartiles.
The plot for Deductible shows a linear function with only a slight curvature (see
Figure 3.3a). This may indicate a non-linear specification or just a deviation with
non-significant implications. The plot for Contribution suggests a non-linear, s-shaped
relationship (see Figure 3.3b).
Method (3): The third method is the modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test (see Section
3.2.3). For Deductible, the test is performed with dummies for 1/8 of the predicted
values, and for Contribution with dummies for 1/6 of the predicted values. Both
F-statistics show that there is a systematic pattern between the residuals and the
particular attribute (both p-values of the F-statistics are 0.00). According to these
results, Deductible and Contribution should not be specified as linear.
(a) Deductible (b) Health Insurance Contribution
Figure 3.3: Plots of estimated probit regression coefficients vs. approximate quartile
midpoints of Deductible and Contribution
Note: Coefficients are from a regression of the dependent variable (0 if the respondent opted for the
status quo, 1 if he or she opted for the alternative) on three dummies for the second, third, and fourth
quartiles of Deductible and Contribution, respectively, and the remaining attributes. In the plot the
coefficient of the first quartile’s dummy is set to zero.
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Step 4: To test for interactions, the LR test is used. Every possible interaction between
the attributes is tested. For evidence about the functional form of the attributes, the
LR test is also performed for terms of second and higher orders. The interactions
proven to be significant are presented in Table 3.3.
Summarizing the findings from Steps 3 and 4, the Deductible smoothed scatter
plot suggests a squared specification (see Figure 3.2a). Figure 3.3a favors a linear
or quadratic form. Whereas these methods do not draw a final conclusion (the
deviations could be non-significant implications for the specification), the modified
Hosmer-Lemeshow test clearly favors a non-linear utility function. The LR tests in
Step 4 support this finding. According to the LR test, both a squared and a cubic
term significantly contribute to an improvement of fit. Backward selection procedures
and goodness-of-fit tests are required to decide the final specification.
The smoothed scatter plot for Contribution (see Figure 3.2b) and the ”design
variables” (see Figure 3.3b) suggest a non-linear specification. The Hosmer-Lemeshow
test confirms this result. However, it is unclear how many higher-order terms should
be included. The LR tests suggest going to the fourth power. Backward selection and
goodness-of-fit tests are also required for the final specification of this attribute.
Step 5: A backward selection procedure is performed and the results are as-
sessed in view of goodness-of-fit. The most parsimonious utility function that still
passes all specification tests is the following: Besides all main effects, interac-
Table 3.3: Interactions and terms of higher order resulting from Step 4
Copayment × Alternative Wait Innovation × Generics
Copayment × Generics Wait Innovation × Contribution
Copayment × Contribution Alternative × Contribution
Contribution2 Deductible2
Contribution3 Deductible3
Contribution4
Note: For labels see Table 3.1
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Table 3.4: Comparison of goodness-of-fit results linear and non-linear utility function
Test statistic Linear utility function Non-linear utility function
(1) (2)
Link test p-value 0.00 0.15
Reset test F-stat p-value 0.00 0.09
Copas test F-stat p-value 0.90 0.71
Modified HL test F-stat p-value 0.00 0.80
HL test χ2-stat p-value 0.00 0.63
Pearson Correlation Coefficient 0.03 0.00
- p-value 0.00 0.74
AIC 7, 272 6,320
BIC 7, 322 6,442
LL −3, 629 -3,143
LR test 0.00
N 9, 655 9, 655
Note: AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion and BIC is the Bayesian Information Crite-
rion. LL is the log likelihood, evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimator. Boldface entries
indicate the better specification for the particular criterion.
tions are Alternative × Copayment, Wait Innovation × Generics, Copayment ×
Generics, Wait Innovation × Contribution, and Copayment × Contribution (note
that Alternative × Contribution is dropped compared to Table 3.3). Deductible has
to be included in squares and Contribution to the power of four. This will later be re-
ferred to as the ”non-linear” utility function, as opposed to the ”linear” utility function
containing the main effects only.
3.4.2 Comparison of Goodness-of-Fit
In this section, the utility functions are compared with regard to goodness-of-fit.
The results of the tests presented in Section 3.2.3 are shown in Table 3.4. The linear
specification fails in all but one test (see column (1)). Neither the Link, the Reset,
nor one of the Hosmer-Lemeshow tests support the linear utility function. This
specification only passes the Copas test. However, this was expected, since Copas is
a test for over-fitting the data and the model is very parsimonious, containing only
the main effects. The non-linear utility function passes all the tests presented. Only
the Reset test might attract attention, with a p-value of 0.09. Strict adherence to a
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10 percent level of statistical significance would point out a possible s-shaped misfit.
However, considering the richness of the data set (1,000 respondents with ten decisions
each, resulting in 10,000 observations), it is important not to rely too strictly on
test statistics. The p-value most likely does not point out a significant misfit in this case.
Performing the modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test, the size of the data set allows the
building of 40 groups, each comprising 2.5 percent of the predicted values. Figures 3.4
and 3.5 present the coefficients from regressing the residuals (from a regression of the
dependent variable on the attributes’ main effects (Figure 3.4) or the main effects and
the additional variables for non-linearity (Figure 3.5), respectively) on dummies for
the 40 groups. If there was no misspecification, the coefficients would be distributed
randomly among the zero-line. However, Figure 3.4 shows a systematic u-shaped
pattern. Consequently, the linear specification fails the test of no misfit. The pattern
for the non-linear utility function (see Figure 3.5) passes the test with a p-value of
0.80 when testing the residuals to be zero jointly. From Figure 3.5, the coefficients
are seen to be distributed close to randomly among the zero-line. Both the Akaike
and Bayesian information criteria prefer the non-linear utility function, as well as the
log-likelihood. An LR test shows that the added variables significantly contribute to a
better fit of the utility function.
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Figure 3.4: Regression result modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test linear utility function
Figure 3.5: Regression result modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test non-linear utility func-
tion
Note: Coefficients are from a regression of the residuals on dummy variables for 1/40 of the predicted
values.
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3.4.3 Comparison of Willingness-to-Pay
In this section, the utility functions are compared with regard to estimated WTP.
If there is no significant difference, the linear utility function can be seen as a good
approximation. If the results differ significantly, it emphasizes the necessity to apply
statistical specification rules in DCE analysis.
Table 3.5 shows the estimated WTP values for the linear utility function (WTPl,
column (1)) and the non-linear utility function (WTPn, column (4)).
5 All WTP are
calculated in terms of health insurance contributions, i.e. βn in Equation (3.5) is
the coefficient of the attribute Contribution. Because WTP is not constant with
the non-linear utility function, the estimated values are stated subject to the other
attributes being equal to the status-quo level. Columns (2) and (5) of Table 3.5 show
standard errors according to the delta method. As Mullahy and Manning (1996) note
in the context of cost-effectiveness analysis, the delta method does not work well in
the case of ratios. They present two safe strategies for calculating confidence intervals
of ratios, one of which is bootstrapping. For this purpose, both utility functions have
been bootstrapped simultaneously with 1,000 iterations (see columns (3) and (6)
for the standard errors). This approach allows comparison of the estimates directly,
t-testing the bootstrapped differences in WTP. This result is shown in column (8) of
Table 3.5.
With both utility functions, the estimated WTP values are significantly different from
zero. However, the difference between WTPl and WTPn is of considerable magnitude
and is statistically significant in three out of five attributes. (1) The linear approach
suggests that the respondents are willing to pay CHF 24 per month for the coverage of
more alternative treatment methods (Alternative). With the non-linear specification,
this value decreases to CHF 12 per month. (2) For a more restrictive reimbursement
5For the estimated coefficients see Table 3.6 in the Appendix. The coefficients of the higher-order
terms are rather small, but nevertheless significantly different from zero. A specification neglecting
these terms was tested for the sake of parsimony. However, in this case the Reset test signals a clear
misfit, as does the (modified) Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
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of pharmaceuticals (Generics), respondents have to be compensated with a reduction
in health insurance contributions of CHF 13 per month when estimating the linear
specification. This willingness-to-accept more than doubles to CHF 29 when using the
non-linear function. (3) Concerning financing, respondents ask for a reduction of CHF
19 in health insurance contributions (WTPl) with an increase in the copayment rate
(Copayment) from 10 to 20 percent. With the non-linear specification, respondents
ask for a reduction of CHF 32 per month. However, the differences in compensation
for delayed coverage of treatment methods (Wait Innovation), a marginal increase in
the deductible (Deductible), and the difference in the status-quo bias (Constant) are
small and non-significant.
The specification of the utility function has considerable effects on estimated WTP.
The consequences of using the linear specification as a simplification can be striking.
In the case of the presented DCE, these might include the following. (1) A health
insurer might launch an alternative contract reimbursing more alternative treatment
methods for an increase in premiums of CHF 24 per month (assuming this amount
covers costs). The number of people actually buying the contract will be much lower
than expected, because enrollees are willing to pay, on average, an increase of only
CHF 12 per month for the additional benefits. (2) The regulator may propose to
reimburse only the cheapest pharmaceutical product on the list of benefits and to
decrease health insurance premiums by CHF 13 per month. However, the decrease in
contributions is lower than the amount people ask for cuts in benefits. Inefficiencies
result. (3) One may propose to decrease health insurance contributions by CHF 19
per month in exchange for an increase in the copayment rate from 10 to 20 percent
and a maximum of CHF 1,200 instead of CHF 600 per year, with the advantage of
mitigating moral hazard. However, the results show that respondents ask for higher
compensation (CHF 32 per month) to accept this increase. This proposition might
thus cause inefficiencies.
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Simultaneously bootstrapping the linear and non-linear utility functions allows the
comparison of the two sets of WTP values. Figure 3.6 shows 95 percent confidence
ellipses,6 where the solid line corresponds to the linear function and the dashed line to
the non-linear utility function. The x-axes are the denominators of the marginal WTP
(where the marginal WTP is equal to the marginal rate of substitution, see Equation
(3.5)). The y-axes are the numerators. In the case of the linear utility function, the
axes equal the single estimated coefficients (the x-axis is always equal to Contribution,
the y-axes vary). In the case of the non-linear utility function, the x-axes are single
coefficients (for Constant, Alternative, Generics) or combinations of coefficients
(for Wait Innovation, Copayment, and Deductible). The y-axes are combinations of
coefficients for all attributes in this case.
From Table 3.5, it can be seen that the standard errors become larger with the non-
linearities. This increase is visible in Figure 3.6 as well, where the ellipses become
larger. The positions of the pairwise ellipses provide information about the origin of
differences in WTP estimates. For example, in the plot for the coverage of alterna-
tive treatment methods (Figure 3.6b), the origins of the two ellipses have almost the
same x-coordinate, but different y-coordinates. The decrease in WTP from CHF 24
(WTPl, see Table 3.5) to CHF 12 (WTPn) therefore mostly results from the change in
Alternative. Hence, respondents value a marginal increase in Contribution almost the
same. However, coverage of additional treatment methods is valued less with the non-
linear specification than with the linear. The same holds for Generics (Figure 3.6c),
where the increase in willingness-to-accept from CHF 13 to CHF 29 per month results
6The estimated coefficients are normally distributed by assumption. Linear combinations of nor-
mal random variables are normally distributed as well, and so Figure 3.6 shows bivariate normal
distributions. These belong to the elliptical family (McNiel et al., 2005). This makes the confidence
curves ellipses. The ellipses can also be interpreted as visual indicators of correlation (SAS Institute
Corp., 1999). An ellipse collapses diagonally as the attributes become perfectly positively or nega-
tively correlated. In case of uncorrelated attributes, the ellipse is circular or the orientation is aligned
with a coordinate axis. If the ellipse’s orientation is to the northeast or the southwest quadrant, the
attributes are positively correlated. If it is towards the northwest or the southeast quadrant, there
is negative correlation. Further, from the orientation of the ellipses, it can be seen whether the 95
percent confidence regions are likely to include the origin or not. If this were the case, then the delta-
method approximation would fail (see Gleser and Hwang, 1987). The Fieller method would provide
the appropriate alternative (see Fieller, 1954, and for applications e.g. Willen and O’Brien, 1996 or
Heitjan, 2000).
Why the Linear Utility Function is a Risky Choice in Discrete-Choice Experiments 67
mostly from Generics. In the case of Copayment (Figure 3.6e), the valuation of both
attributes changes with the specification. The x- and the y-coordinates are shifted.
This is due to the interaction term Copayment× Contributions.
(a) Constant (b) Alternative (c) Generics
(d) Innovation (e) Copayment (f) Deductible
Figure 3.6: 95 percent confidence ellipses for marginal WTP
Note: Solid line = linear utility function, (de)nominator is equal to estimated coefficient (see Equa-
tion 3.4); dashed line = non-linear utility function, (de)nominator is equal to estimated coeffi-
cient (nominator: Constant, Alternative, Generics) or linear combination of coefficients (nominator:
Wait Innovation, Copayment, Deductible; denominator: Contributions).
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3.5 Conclusions
When estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP) using discrete-choice experiments (DCEs),
the utility function is most commonly assumed to be linear in the attributes. In-
teractions and higher-order terms are set to zero with reference to Louviere et al.
(2000). Non-linearities are only implemented if they are of special interest or in the
guise of interactions with socioeconomic characteristics to investigate heterogeneity in
preferences. However, it can be argued that the utility function is unlikely to be linear
because of diminishing marginal utility and gain-loss asymmetries (Hoyos, 2010).
This paper addresses the issue of the utility function’s form by showing that the
linear approximation can be a risky choice in DCEs. For this purpose, an experiment
conducted by Becker (2006, Chapters 6-8) in Switzerland is reexamined. The DCE
assesses preferences for Swiss statutory health insurance and WTP for proposed
reforms. The attributes describe changes in the list of benefits (inclusion of additional
alternative treatment methods, reimbursement of only the cheapest pharmaceuticals
(generics), delayed access to new treatment methods) and changes in financing
(increased copayment rate, change in deductible and health insurance contributions).
The DCE is estimated in two ways, first using a linear utility function, including the
main effects only, and second using a non-linear utility function, allowing for interac-
tions and terms of higher order. The procedure of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) is
used for the specification of non-linearities, following the statistical model-specification
literature. In a first step, the utility functions are tested for misfits, using a variety
of goodness-of-fit measures as proposed by Basu et al. (2004) and Basu et al. (2006).
The linear utility function is found to perform better with regard to over-fitting, but
to have serious misfit problems. However, the non-linear utility function is found to
present the data well. In a second step, the utility functions are compared with regard
to estimated WTP, stated in terms of health insurance contributions. The results
are found to significantly differ in terms of statistical significance and in magnitude
for three out of five attributes. (1) With the linear utility function, respondents are
willing to pay CHF 24 per month for the reimbursement of additional alternative
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treatment methods. With the non-linear specification, estimated WTP decreases to
CHF 12 per month. (2) The linear specification proposes that respondents must be
compensated with a decrease in contributions of CHF 12 per month in order to accept
the reimbursement of only the cheapest pharmaceuticals (generics). However, this
willingness-to-accept more than doubles with the non-linear utility function at CHF
29 per month. (3) An increase in the copayment rate from 10 to 20 percent with a
simultaneous increase in the maximum copayment from CHF 600 to CHF 1,200 per
year must be compensated with a decrease in contributions of CHF 19 per month with
the linear specification, but rises to CHF 32 per month with the non-linear specification.
These findings suggest that the form of the utility function can have significant impact
on estimated WTP. Using the linear specification as an approximation may lead to
seriously biased estimates. Since DCEs are playing an increasingly significant role in
health care decision making, the assumption of a linear utility function may lead to
inefficient use of health care resources.
However, this research is subject to several limitations. It can be argued that the linear
functional form is a poor approximation in this setting, but might sufficiently serve
in others. Also, there is no ”best” way of finding an appropriate model specification.
The methodological debate is still ongoing, and will certainly continue into the future.
A disadvantage of the procedure presented here is that finding the non-linearities is
very time-consuming. The limiting factor is not computer power but rather creativity
in finding a model that passes all specification tests simultaneously. Finally, the
form of the utility function is one among many aspects of DCEs that need further
consideration. Issues range from questionnaire development and choosing experimental
designs to applications of new econometric methods (for a summary see Louviere and
Lancsar, 2009 or Hoyos, 2010). However, given the presented findings, the form of
the utility function is an important issue in DCE analysis which should be taken into
account for future DCEs.
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Appendix
Table 3.6: Results random-effects probit estimation, linear and non-linear utility func-
tion
Linear Utility Function Non-linear Utility Function
Variable Coefficient St.error Coefficient St.error
Constant −0.4548∗∗∗ 0.0617 −0.4191∗∗∗ 0.1332
Alternative 0.3409∗∗∗ 0.0419 0.1692∗∗∗ 0.0626
Generics −0.1779∗∗∗ 0.0417 −0.4198∗∗∗ 0.0924
Wait Innovation −0.5623∗∗∗ 0.0480 −0.7377∗∗∗ 0.0735
Copayment −0.2723∗∗∗ 0.0428 −0.6424∗∗∗ 0.0924
Deductible −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0000 −0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001
Contribution −0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0006 −0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0026
Copayment × Alternative 0.3311∗∗∗ 0.0940
Wait Innovation × Generics 0.3808∗∗∗ 0.1177
Copayment × Generics 0.2058∗ 0.1090
Wait Innovation × Contribution −0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0015
Copayment × Contribution −0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0015
Deductible2 4.e− 08∗∗∗ 1.e− 08
Contribution2 0.0006∗∗ 0.0003
Contribution3 2.e− 06∗∗ 1.e− 06
Contribution4 −2.e− 07∗∗ 9.e− 08
σµ 0.9639
∗∗∗ 0.0426 0.9941∗∗∗ 0.4412
ρ 0.4816∗∗∗ 0.0221 0.4970∗∗∗ 0.0222
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1, ** at the 5, and * at the 10 percent level
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4 Capping Risk Adjustment?
4.1 Introduction
When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment (RA) is introduced in order
to reduce competitive insurers’ incentive to select favorable risks. On the other hand,
unless fully prospective, it undermines their incentive for efficiency (Ellis and Van de
Ven, 2000). This goal conflict has been addressed by Van Barneveld et al. (2001),
who estimate optimal thresholds in the cost distribution beyond which RA sets in.
However, the implementation of such a rule becomes difficult when the distribution
of health care expenditure (HCE) not only shifts over time (e.g. due to a particularly
high rate of cost increase in the hospital sector) but also differs between insurers
(e.g. due to more or less reliance on Managed-Care (MC) options). Therefore, as a
rough-and-ready measure, one might consider simply capping the volume of RA. In
this way, one exposes insurers to some residual financial risk. At the same time, there
is dissatisfaction with the performance of current RA formulas (Van de Ven et al.,
2003). The expectation is that by adding risk adjusters, incentives for risk selection
could be reduced even more. However, refinements of the RA formula quite likely
cause the volume of RA to increase. They therefore are in conflict with the desire to
preserve efficiency through capping the volume of RA.
There is a second motivation for limiting the volume of RA, which becomes evident
as soon as one recognizes the analogy between RA and a levy (and a subsidy,
respectively). In the economics of taxation, a distinction is consistently made between
those who pay a levy and those who ultimately bear it. In the case of RA, payments
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into the scheme are ultimately borne by the favorable risks whose premiums exceed
the (estimated) actuarially fair value. They in fact cross-subsidize the premiums of
unfavorable risks. A part of this cross-subsidization occurs through community-rated
premiums. The remainder is paid (but not borne) by health insurers. Analysis of RA
schemes so far has exclusively focused on this second, more visible component. It is
designed to neutralize insurers’ incentives to select favorable risks and is often referred
to as ”volume of RA”. To avoid confusion, this definition will be used in this chapter1.
However, note that it is the total amount of cross-subsidization that drives consumer
behavior. Favorable risks have an interest in avoiding the cross-subsidy by seeking out
an insurer who offers a premium closer to the actuarially fair volume, which remains
possible as long as RA is not perfect. Conversely, unfavorable risks have an interest in
obtaining a high cross-subsidy through their choice of insurer.
Both concerns have become important in Switzerland, a country with competitive
social health insurance. By 2005, cross-subsidization (CS, between individuals) had
reached CHF 4.8 billion (bn.), about 1 percent of Swiss GDP (CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.83).
Thus, RA had turned into a redistributive scheme in its own right. The volume of
risk adjustment (RA, between insurers, partly retrospective) amounted to CHF 1.2
bn., or some 20 percent of their payments for HCE. This was seen as incompatible
with the efficiency goal by the Swiss Council of States, who considered limiting the
volume of RA to its 2004 value (inspired by the capping-proposal by Spycher, 2000).
At the same time, parliament decided to add the criterion, ”Hospitalization or living
in a nursing home during the previous year” (”hospitalization” henceforth) to the RA
formula, effective 2012. This decision was influenced by Beck et al. (2006), who had
found that this criterion serves to substantially reduce insurers’ payoff to risk selection.
With this backdrop, the present contribution purports to achieve two objectives.
First, it seeks to establish the opportunity cost of capping the volume of RA in terms
of increased incentives for risk selection. Second, it investigates the consequences of
1Interestingly however, Swiss statistics also do publish the amount of cross-subsidization between
individuals as ”volume of RA” (see Joint Organization KVG, 2005).
Capping Risk Adjustment? 75
complementing the RA formula by the criterion ”hospitalization”. The main results of
this paper are twofold. First, the introduction of the hospitalization adjuster is shown
to inflate the volume of CS and of RA in every canton of Switzerland, in some of them
by more than 50 percent. Second, reducing the amount of CS from an estimated CHF
5.375 bn. to CHF 4.5 bn. (its 2004 volume) would reduce the volume of RA between
insurers from an estimated CHF 1.1 bn. to CHF 0.98 bn. To minimize the associated
incentives for insurers to increase their risk-selection efforts, the new RA values have
to be the higher, the greater the differences between group-specific values prior to the
limitation and the greater the group’s population share.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 is devoted to a description of the data
basis, descriptive statistics, and checks of the representativeness of the data. Section
4.3 shows how the volumes of CS and RA change when the additional criterion is
introduced. Section 4.4 then takes up the issue of capping the volume of risk adjustment.
The consequences for consumers, insurers, and Swiss cantons are analyzed. In Section
4.5, limiting the volume of RA is accepted as a way to preserve insurers’ incentives
for efficiency, giving rise to an optimization problem since insurers’ tendency to turn
to risk selection again should be minimized. Section 4.6 discusses the consequences of
capping RA, illustrating them with an empirical example. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Data Basis, Descriptive Statistics, and
Representativeness
In order to carry out this research, three large Swiss health insurers provided
individual health insurance data. Their holders of basic health insurance during
the period 2001 to 2005 were considered, totaling 2.78 million (mn.) individuals.
Besides socioeconomic variables like age, gender, and canton of residence, data on
ambulatory and hospital health care expenditure (HCE), drug expenditure, and a
variable indicating hospitalization or living in a nursing home in the previous year
were collected. To characterize the type of health insurance, the deductible and a
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variable indicating choice between conventional and MC contracts were included as
well. With 49.5 percent of women, the sample is well balanced with respect to gender.
The market share of the three insurers is stable across the age profile, amounting to 25
percent on average. Across the 26 Swiss cantons, they are over-represented in eastern
and central Switzerland and under-represented in the northern and western parts of
the country.
In Swiss health insurance, premiums are community-rated. They are uniform in 16
cantons, the remaining cantons distinguishing up to three premium regions. In 2005,
32 percent of the population lived in cantons with uniform premiums, while 25 percent
lived in a high, 27 percent in a medium, and 16 percent in a low premium region.
With regard to the choice of contract, there is a clear trend toward higher deductibles.
Whereas in 2001, policies with the minimum deductible (which amounts to CHF 300
or USD 250 at 2007 exchange rates) had a share of over 56 percent, this share had
decreased to 50 percent by 2005. The three highest deductibles (CHF 1,500, 2,000,
and 2,500, respectively) increased in importance from 12 to over 22 percent during the
same period. There is a similar trend in favor of MC contracts. Especially consumers
aged 31 to 35 use this option, resulting in a share of 22 percent in this age group.
However, older age cohorts increasingly prefer MC contracts as well. For instance,
among the over 80 year old, their share went up from 10 to 18 percent between 2001
and 2005.
In Swiss RA, only two criteria are considered, age and gender. The age classification
comprises 15 classes, starting from 19-25 and continuing in 5-year steps. By law, RA
must not lead to financial reallocation between cantons. The national volumes of CS
and RA therefore equal the sum of the cantonal volumes. Computing these volumes
using the sample data of the three insurers and their market shares yields a CS total
of CHF 4.13 bn., the national figure being CHF 4.8 bn. (see Joint Organization KVG,
2005).
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Table 4.1: Volume of cross-subsidy per canton, CHF (2005)
Canton mn.* mn.** p.c.* p.c.** Canton mn.* mn.** p.c.* p.c.**
ZH 735.82 796.47 713 771 SH 39.18 47.50 649 787
BE 592.03 678.17 768 879 AR 20.10 24.85 483 597
LU 193.80 211.23 691 753 AI 6.48 7.43 570 654
UR 17.57 19.97 636 723 SG 196.02 238.19 545 662
SZ 57.00 70.85 533 662 GR 95.91 110.26 616 708
OW 13.01 16.41 497 626 AG 259.61 312.05 573 689
NW 15.13 17.23 485 552 TH 105.30 126.78 579 697
GL 16.52 19.89 544 656 TI 226.03 270.02 869 1,038
ZG 47.57 54.14 566 644 VD 430.40 502.39 852 994
FR 121.48 146.44 625 754 VS 160.39 170.13 685 726
SO 122.07 154.65 614 778 NE 104.10 130.63 784 984
BS 110.21 161.97 719 1,057 GE 257.43 333.04 816 1,056
BL 149.81 172.14 697 800 JU 39.45 52.32 733 972
Note: * Simulation, ** Official data from Joint Organization KVG (2005), p.c. = per capita,
CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.83 at 2007 exchange rates
In all cantons, the calculated volumes of CS (see Table 4.1) and RA fall short of
the official ones. The difference is smallest in the canton of Zurich (ZH), Lucerne
(LU), and Valais (VS), amounting to less than 10 percent. It is between 10 and 20
percent in 9 other cantons, where the three insurers only hold small market shares.
This marked discrepancy could reflect successful risk-selection efforts, which have
high expected return if targeted at a small population at risk (as shown in Zweifel
and Eisen, 2005, Chapter 5.5). However, there is no significant (negative) correlation
between market shares of the three insurers and deviations from the official CS and
RA figures, suggesting that risk selection is not the explanation.
Table 4.2 focuses on CS values, in accordance with the argument proffered in the
Introduction that they are the ones that trigger risk-selection effort on the part of
consumers. Calculated cross-subsidies per capita for all 30 groups used in RA are
shown, along with their standard errors and official countrywide values. Young men
have to bear the highest cross-subsidies (over CHF 2,000 per year), followed by young
women with CHF 1,773 per year. Over 90 year old women benefit the most, to the
tune of over CHF 8,600, followed by women of age 86 to 90 with CHF 6,917 and
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men of age 90+ with CHF 6,731. All age groups over 60 are cross-subsidized by the
combination of community-rating and RA.
Table 4.2: Simulated and official cross-subsidies per capita according to age and gender,
CHF (2005)
Men Average* Std.error Min Max Official value
19-25 −2, 006.50 505.52 −3, 006.17 −707.84 −1, 963.87
26-30 −1, 227.59 833.80 −2, 165.91 2, 287.40 −1, 889.64
31-35 −900.68 678.91 −1, 733.38 1, 202.03 −1, 771.42
36-40 −979.03 421.93 −1, 749.27 247.62 −1, 624.49
41-45 −828.69 351.55 −1, 435.17 −40.31 −1, 398.94
46-50 −543.46 465.97 −1, 615.88 349.08 −1, 091.94
51-55 −109.82 378.55 −977.63 714.71 −624.63
56-60 290.34 300.27 −557.57 815.53 13.40
61-65 884.74 418.34 228.53 1, 648.89 771.06
66-70 1, 560.60 598.50 187.69 2, 464.57 1, 638.40
71-75 2, 535.19 548.54 982.57 3, 435.54 2, 873.43
76-80 3, 208.98 653.35 1, 884.58 4, 128.30 3, 845.50
81-85 4, 127.79 1, 361.80 1, 261.52 6, 983.73 4, 986.30
86-90 5, 286.51 1, 208.24 2, 752.09 7, 945.75 6, 880.09
90+ 6, 731.78 1, 513.63 2, 945.10 8, 915.78 9, 541.96
Women Average* Std.error Min Max Official value
19-25 −1, 772.99 494.20 −2, 780.08 −974.44 −1, 484.37
26-30 −1, 024.61 461.54 −2, 211.50 −311.71 −946.01
31-35 −746.06 559.49 −1, 694.31 −1, 125.73 −749.83
36-40 −961.00 328.45 −1, 576.69 −316.11 −924.81
41-45 −965.85 279.05 −1, 749.34 −535.99 −922.02
46-50 −732.01 309.04 −1, 295.60 −177.44 −646.82
51-55 −442.87 268.14 −1, 045.08 106.95 −235.80
56-60 −15.51 321.10 −512.16 841.85 205.36
61-65 443.65 247.14 19.55 764.95 737.31
66-70 981.80 395.53 210.13 1, 603.77 1, 415.39
71-75 1, 982.76 446.04 758.34 2, 662.32 2, 385.07
76-80 3, 136.84 656.22 1, 838.10 4, 406.12 3, 671.81
81-85 4, 641.23 775.55 2, 788.30 6, 111.25 5, 596.14
86-90 6, 917.12 987.66 5, 115.11 8, 382.98 8, 486.06
90+ 8, 672.75 1, 770.15 4, 464.86 11, 619.96 12, 457.28
Note: * Average over all 26 Swiss cantons, CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.83 at 2007 exchange rates
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A comparison with official values (see the last column of Table 4.2) shows calculated
values to be too high for younger and too low for older individuals, especially for women.
These deviations are mainly responsible for the underestimation of the total CS and
RA volumes noted above. Table 4.2 also shows that the variance of CS values increases
with age. While the standard deviation is CHF 494 for young women, it attains CHF
1,770 for the oldest age class, reflecting the fact that the variance of HCE increases
with age. Overall, calculated figures come close enough to official CS values to justify
the use of sample data in the investigation below.
4.3 Hospitalization as an Additional Criterion
Current Swiss RA uses only the two criteria age and gender. However, the hospi-
talization adjuster will be added to the RA formula from 2012. Beck (2004) and
Beck et al. (2006) estimate that this criterion has considerable predictive power in
explaining future HCE. To prevent gaming by insurers, stays of less than four days
are not counted. Maternity stays are excluded as well since according to Beck (2004),
they do not significantly increase HCE in the following year. The new RA formula
will continue to be partly retrospective because it uses observed rather than predicted
HCE values.
The new criterion has several advantages. It is very easily collected; moreover, being a
dummy variable it does not make computation of RA payments much more difficult.
While the formula currently distinguishes 30 age-gender cells, the number of classes
would only increase to 60 (for a discussion on other alternatives and their drawbacks see
e.g. Lamers, 1999, Ellis and Van de Ven, 2000, Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003a, Lamers
and Van Vliet, 2003b, Van de Ven et al., 2004, Beck et al., 2006, and Van de Ven et al.,
2007). Moreover, the data is readily available in every insurer’s administrative database.
Taking this additional criterion into account, calculated cross-subsidies would increase
from CHF 4.13 bn. (as of 2005) to CHF 5.82 bn., i.e. by 40 percent. According to
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Table 4.3, every canton would exhibit an increase. To put these into perspective, note
that premiums e.g. in the canton of Zurich were CHF 4,000. Therefore, the per-capita
cross-subsidy of CHF 870 would have attained almost 22 percent of premium under
the new RA formula.
Moreover, the change would have completely overthrown the customary CS age and
gender profiles. Whereas under the current RA formula, the young of both genders are
Table 4.3: Cross-subsidization without and with the hospitalization adjuster, CHF
(2005)
Without the criterion With the criterion
Canton CHF mn. CHF per capita CHF mn. CHF per capita % Increase
ZH 735.82 713 898.24 870 22.1
BE 592.03 768 833.26 1, 080 40.7
LU 193.80 691 292.31 1, 042 50.8
UR 17.57 636 26.00 941 48.0
SZ 57.00 533 84.29 788 47.9
OW 13.37 497 22.98 877 71.9
NW 15.13 485 21.35 684 41.0
GL 16.52 544 24.23 798 46.6
ZG 47.57 566 71.94 855 51.2
FR 121.48 625 184.14 948 51.6
SO 122.07 614 176.52 889 44.6
BS 110.21 719 171.37 1, 118 55.5
BL 149.81 697 201.91 939 34.8
SH 39.18 649 59.72 989 52.4
AR 20.10 483 32.94 791 63.9
AI 6.48 570 9.58 842 47.8
SG 196.02 545 298.32 829 52.2
GR 95.91 616 137.59 884 43.5
AG 259.61 573 363.64 803 40.1
TH 105.30 579 173.73 955 65.0
TI 226.03 869 313.01 1, 203 38.5
VD 430.40 852 593.60 1, 175 37.9
VS 160.39 685 226.85 969 41.4
NE 104.10 784 166.65 1, 255 60.1
GE 257.43 816 375.23 1, 190 45.8
JU 39.45 733 54.38 1, 010 37.8
Note: CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.83 at 2007 exchange rates
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Figure 4.1: Cross-subsidies by age group, persons without / with hospitalization or
living in nursing home during the previous year, canton of Zurich, CHF (2005)
burdened to the benefit of those beyond age 60, the new formula makes hospitalization
the crucial determinant of CS values. Figure 4.1 illustrates the case of the canton of
Zurich. The additional adjuster would cause persons with a hospital stay in 2004 to be
cross-subsidized in 2005 regardless of age or gender. It is remarkable that until age 50,
men benefit more (due to a higher rate of hospitalization) than do women. With the
additional criterion, women contribute less to and receive more from CS, with the age
group 51-55 marking the crossover (except for the 66-70 bracket).
4.4 Limiting the Volume of Risk Adjustment
The volumes of CS and RA have increased significantly since 1996 (see Table 4.4),
when the new law on health insurance came into effect (and along with it, RA). Both
CS growth (80.1 percent up to 2005) and RA growth (126.8 percent) have consistently
outstripped the 60.9 percent of net HCE (defined as payments by health insurers
with copayment deducted). While HCE growth, ceteris paribus, increases incentives
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of both favorable risks and insurers to engage in risk selection, it evidently fails to
fully explain the development of CS and RA volumes. Those discrepancies can be
interpreted in two ways.
On the one hand, rapid growth of RA volume may be the consequence of increases
of risk-selection effort in excess of HCE growth. On the part of insurers, this is
the predicted response to increasing discrepancies between risk-based premiums
and imposed community-rating (see Zweifel, 2007 for a theoretical development).
According to Table 4.2, this may well have been the case since the increase in variance
of HCE (reflected by the standard error of cross-subsidies) is mainly associated with
age (and hence, higher HCE). With HCE growing rapidly from 1996 to 2005 (see Table
4.4 again), its variance likely grew as well and with it the gap between actuarially fair
and community-rated premiums. On the part of consumers, favorable risks may well
have stepped up their efforts at avoiding the rapidly increasing burden of CS. One
way was to opt for higher deductibles and MC options because insurers, while not
Table 4.4: Volumes of cross-subsidization (CS) and risk adjustment (RA), CHF (1996-
2005)
Year Vol. CS Change Vol. RA Change Vol. HCEn∗ Change
(CHF mn.) (%) (CHF mn.) (%) (CHF mn.) (%)
1996 2,700 − 530 − 10,779 −
1997 2,920 +8.2 531 +0.2 11,361 +5.4
1998 3,195 +9.4 609 +14.7 11,927 +5.0
1999 3,366 +5.3 660 +8.4 12,431 +4.2
2000 3,575 +6.2 735 +11.4 13,190 +6.1
2001 3,826 +7.0 853 +16.1 13,986 +6.0
2002 4,009 +4.8 937 +9.8 14,593 +4.3
2003 4,250 +6.0 1,009 +7.7 15,336 +5.1
2004 4,568 +7.5 1,103 +9.3 16,308 +6.3
2005 4,864 +6.4 1,202 +9.0 17,353 +6.4
Avg. change +6.7 +5.4
Total change +80.1 +126.8 +60.9
Note: HCEn∗: HCE - deductibles - copayment, ”net HCE”; p.c. = per capita, CHF 1 ≈ USD
0.83 at 2007 exchange rates, Source: Joint Organization KVG (2005), Federal Office of Public Health
(2007)
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permitted to pass on the full savings, still could pass on more than the ”true” savings
after deduction of risk-selection effects (which amount to between one- and two-thirds
of the full savings in the case of MC, as estimated in Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004).
As stated in Section 4.2, both contractual variants gained a great deal of market
share just between 2001 and 2005. This interpretation points to activities designed to
circumvent premium regulation. They could be reined in by perfecting the RA scheme.
Recall that with perfect RA, insurers would not be able to offer a share of their
”fake” savings to consumers who seek to dodge the cross-subsidy. This consideration
motivated the Swiss parliament to pass a refinement of the RA formula by including
the hospitalization criterion.
On the other hand, RA seems to have become a redistributive scheme with a life of its
own. Indeed, the CS volume in favor of the old grew even faster than the 80 percent
shown in Table 4.4 (not evidenced here), which was not anticipated. A refinement
causes CS and RA volumes to increase even more substantially, as evidenced in
Section 4.3. The consequence is to increasingly shelter insurers from financial risk
undermining their incentive to improve efficiency. These considerations motivated the
Swiss Council of States and the Swiss National Council to discuss capping the CS
volume at its 2005 value (CHF 4.8 bn.).
As a certainly second-best measure, capping the volume of RA (or indeed CS) is con-
sidered below. A simple limit in nominal terms would even have the advantage of
increasing insurers’ risk exposure over time, forcing them to step up their efficiency-
enhancing efforts. It could be imposed at three levels, the aggregate (broken down to
insurers according to market share, which may be changing over time), the individual
insurer (fixed over time), and the consumer (limiting directly the amount of CS). Only
a cap on total CS volume (see second column of Table 4.4) will be considered because it
is invariant to changes in market share and structure. A question that naturally arises
at this point is who bears the consequences of a cap. Three parties can be identified.
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• The individual insured. A cap on CS volume causes premiums to converge towards
risk-rated values, causing CS values to decrease (also leading to a mitigation of
moral-hazard effects (see e.g. Zweifel and Breuer, 2006)).
• The insurers. In a system with community-rated premiums, RA is introduced to
eliminate (or reduce) incentives for risk selection. Capping its volume (directly or
indirectly through limiting CS) causes insurers not to be fully compensated any-
more for enrolling unfavorable risks. In the Swiss context, there are two predicted
responses. One is to eschew high risks, using known means such as losing appli-
cation forms. The other is to form conglomerates with a shared sales office (see
Van de Ven et al., 2003). Potential clients are quickly assessed on the telephone
and assigned to a low-premium affiliate if found a low risk or a high-premium one
otherwise. While the lower risks are happy to accept, the high ones often prefer
accepting the higher premium to overcoming the hurdles erected by conventional
competitors with their lower community-rated premium. Although this practice
is not in the spirit of the law, it is legal because each affiliate of the conglomerate
does charge a uniform premium.
• The cantons. Capping RA increases the financial burden of cantons with an un-
favorable risk structure because the cantons pay part of the subsidies to those (in
part high-risk) citizens whose premiums exceed a certain share of their income.
If the RA volume is capped, high risks become even more unfavorable for health
insurers than before. This is especially true for the low-cost insurers of a con-
glomerate. While the conglomerate cannot legally cancel the policy, it can urge
consumers to move to a high-cost affiliate that also charges higher premiums.
This causes the share of income devoted to health insurance, and hence premium
subsidies to increase, especially if there is a correlation between low income and
high risks. However, the federal government is affected as well through matching
grants.
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4.5 Optimizing the Cap on the Volume of Risk
Adjustment
The preceding section has shown that capping the volume of RA has opportunity costs
in terms of increased risk-selection efforts on the part of both insurers and consumers.
This gives rise to an optimization problem: How is the cap to be allocated to minimize
its opportunity cost? The development below focuses on insurers’ incentive for risk se-
lection, neglecting changes in consumer behavior in response to reduced cross-subsidies.
Swiss RA is based on age and gender. Its values are calculated in the following way,
RAa,g = L¯a,g − L¯, (4.1)
where a and g are indexes for age and gender categories, RAa,g is the payment to
(RAa,g < 0) or from (RAa,g > 0) RA in group (a, g), L¯a,g is average HCE in group
(a, g), and L¯ is average HCE paid by insurers in the population as a whole. The volume
of CS (V ) can then be calculated as in Equation (4.2),
V = {
15∑
a=1
1∑
g=0
|RAa,g|na,g}/2, (4.2)
where na,g is the number of insured of risk group with age a and gender g. RA
payments are considered in absolute values to avoid canceling out of positive and nega-
tive values. However, this makes the division by two necessary to avoid double counting.
Favorable risks contribute to the insurer’s margin, which can be used to cover the
deficits generated by unfavorable risks. The insurer is exposed to a higher risk of
insolvency if these deficits are large. Reserves can be used to ensure solvency, but
too many outliers endanger the economic survival of the insurer. There are several
methods for analyzing the importance of such outliers, such as value-at-risk or
expected shortfall (see Hull, 2006). However, the easiest way to proceed is to analyze
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the variance of HCE falling on the insurer.
If one considers age and gender as the only determinants of HCE (which is in accord
with current Swiss RA), then variance in HCE across these groups is given by
s2L =
∑
a
∑
g(L¯a,g − L¯)2na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
(4.3)
where L¯ is total average HCE in a specific canton (recall that RA is calculated in
each canton separately), and L¯a,g is average HCE of a specific age and gender cell. As
of 2005, s2L is estimated for the canton of Zurich at CHF 6.0 mn. RA thus serves to
reduce the variance of HCE falling on insurers (and therefore mitigate the incentive to
”skim the cream”). This can be seen by plugging Equation (4.1) into Equation (4.3)
and rearranging terms,
s2L =
∑
a
∑
g RA
2
a,gna,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
(4.4)
and hence,
(
∑
a
∑
g
na,g)s
2
L =
∑
a
∑
g
RA2a,gna,g. (4.5)
Equation (4.5) shows that with a constant number of individuals in each age and
gender cell, RA values must be increasing with increasing differences in HCE between
groups. This of course serves to increase RA and CS volume as well. If age and gender
would be the only determinants of HCE (i.e. if insurers had no private information
about individuals, contrary to the analysis by Shen and Ellis, 2002a, Shen and Ellis,
2002b), then risk adjustment would eliminate all risk induced by community-rating.
Prior to capping the volume of RA, the variance borne by the health insurer (s2HI)
would be zero, s2HI=0. This evidently does not hold in the present context because
RA in Switzerland is far from perfect (Beck et al., 2006).2 Whatever the initial value
of s2HI , capping the volume of RA causes it to increase. The objective therefore is to
2Note, however, in both cases (s2HI=0 or s
2
HI=c, where c is a constant) the results for the opti-
mization problem is the same, since a constant cancels out when taking derivatives.
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minimize this increase, subject to CS volume not exceeding the cap V¯ . RA payments
R̂Aa,g are the decision variables in the problem,
min
R̂Aa,g
sˆ2HI − s2HI s.t. V ≤ V¯ , (4.6)
with sˆ2HI denoting the variance when volume is capped. Of course the optimization
must take into account that risk adjustment is zero sum. This however is always
achieved since positive and negative RA values cancel out.
If volume is defined as in Equation (4.2), optimization is difficult due to absolute values.
An alternative approach is therefore taken here. First, the positive half variance sˆ2HI+
(with the restriction on CS volume), and then, the negative half variance sˆ2HI− (with
the same restriction on CS volume) is minimized, ensuring that RA values sum to zero,
min
R̂Aa,g
[(sˆ2HI+) + (sˆ
2
HI−)]− s2HI . (4.7)
Because s2HI is predetermined, it is obvious that only the terms in brackets are relevant.
The first term can be broken down as shown in Equation (4.8),
min sˆ2HI+ =
∑
a
∑
g(xa,g − x¯)2na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
s.t. xa,g > x¯. (4.8)
The symbols are defined as follows,
xa,g = (La,g − R̂Aa,g)
x¯ = L¯
xa,g − x¯ = (La,g − R̂Aa,g − L¯)
= (RAa,g − R̂Aa,g). (4.9)
Here, R̂Aa,g > 0 if the insurer receives a payment from the RA scheme and consumers
in the (a, g) cell receive a cross-subsidy. Conversely, R̂Aa,g < 0 if it pays into the
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scheme (and low-risk consumers bear a cross-subsidy).
Since the restriction V ≤ V¯ always holds as an equality in Equation (4.6), the problem
can be solved using a Lagrangian,
min
R̂Aa,g
Z = (sˆ2+)− λ(
∑
a
∑
g
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ ), ∀ R̂Aa,g > 0 (4.10)
=
∑
a
∑
g(RAa,g − R̂Aa,g)2na,g∑15
a=1
∑1
g=0 na,g
− λ(
∑
a
∑
g
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ ),
where the subscript HI is dropped for simplicity. The solution to this problem shows
how positive payments received from the RA scheme are optimally reduced. Payments
into the scheme (R̂Aa,g < 0) are fully analogous. The first-order conditions are,
∂Z
∂R̂Aa,g
=
−2(RAa,g − R̂Aa,g)na,g∑
a
∑
g na,g
− λna,g = 0 (4.11)
∂Z
∂λ
=
15∑
a=1
1∑
g=0
R̂Aa,gna,g − V¯ = 0.
This is a system of linear equations in R̂Aa,g and λ that has full rank and can therefore
be solved. An example with four risk classes is given as follows.
Assume a hypothetical RA scheme distinguishing four groups i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with ni the
number of individuals in that group and n the overall number of individuals. Let two
groups (0 and 1) have below-average and two (2 and 3), above-average expected HCE.
RAi indicates RA payments for each group. The first-order conditions for negative
payments (i.e. payments to the RA scheme, groups 0 and 1) are,
∂Z
∂R̂A0
=
−2(RA0 − R̂A0)n0
n
− λn0 = 0 (4.12)
∂Z
∂R̂A1
=
−2(RA1 − R̂A1)n1
n
− λn1 = 0
∂Z
∂λ
= R̂A0n0 + R̂A1n1 − V¯ = 0.
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Now λ can be solved for from the first FOC,
λ =
−2(RA0 − R̂A0)
n
. (4.13)
Equation (4.13) shows the determinants of the opportunity cost caused by the cap.
First, the greater the population at risk (n), the smaller this cost. Second, the greater
the difference between RA payments with and without the cap (RA0−R̂A0), the higher
this cost. In addition, the system (4.12) can be solved to yield,
(RA0 − R̂A0) = (RA1 − R̂A1) (4.14)
R̂A0n0 + R̂A1n1 = V¯ .
It is evident that the optimal reductions of RA values are the same across risk cate-
gories. Solving this system of two equations in the two unknowns yields the following
solution payments to the RA scheme,
R̂A0 =
V¯ − (RA1 +RA0)n1
n0 + n1
=
V¯ h1
n1
− (RA1 −RA0)h1 (4.15)
R̂A1 =
V¯ − (RA0 +RA1)n0
n0 + n1
=
V¯ h0
n0
− (RA0 −RA1)h0
with hi noting the share of group i in the subpopulation with below-average HCE.
Therefore, the optimal new RA values are
• the lower, the lower the cap is set;
• the lower, the greater the positive difference in RA values prior to the limitation
(e.g. RA1 > RA0);
• the higher, the greater the negative difference in RA values prior to the limitation
(e.g. RA0 < RA1);
• the higher, the higher the group’s population share hi (even for small n0 since
V¯ >> (RA1 −RA0)).
The payments received from the RA scheme can be derived in an analogous way.
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4.6 Consequences of Capping Risk Adjustment
As argued in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, risk-selection behavior is ultimately driven by the
amount of CS contained in contributions to health insurance. And in the case of Switzer-
land, the political debate revolving around RA has focused on the CS rather than the
RA volume. For these reasons, this section cites more CS rather than RA figures.
4.6.1 Theoretical Considerations
The question as to the optimal value of the cap cannot be addressed in this paper.
It requires knowledge of citizens’ willingness-to-pay for avoiding risk-selection efforts
by health insurers while keeping community-rated premiums. Experimental evidence
concerning willingness-to-pay for attributes of health services provision has been
presented (in e.g. Telser et al., 2004, Zweifel et al., 2006, and concerning attributes of
health insurance, in Becker, 2006 and Becker et al., 2007). However, willingness-to-pay
for maintaining community-rated premiums has not been measured to the knowledge
of the authors. As a second-best solution, parliament could decide on the value of the
cap, assuming that politicians represent the preferences of the population.
While the political debate has focused on the national level, cantons will likely be
affected as well. As evident from Equations (4.9) and (4.11), the opportunity cost
of a cap on RA is linked to the dispersion of HCE, which varies between cantons.
If CS and hence RA volumes were to be limited, many citizens with low incomes
would have to pay higher premiums. This creates political pressure for increased
redistribution through premium subsidies. More generous cantons would be more
prone to increasing their subsidies, which are matched by the federal level, where
a substantial amount of redistribution between cantons takes place. Therefore, a
limit on CS and RA volumes is likely to induce a certain amount of CS between cantons.
Focusing on the opportunity cost of a cap in terms of incentives when an additional
adjuster is introduced, there are two effects to be distinguished. First, since HCE is now
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predicted more precisely, the variance of HCE borne by insurers decreases and with it
risk-selection effort. Second, unless the additional adjuster exhibits perfectly negative
correlation with the existing ones, CS and RA volumes must increase. However, the
incidence of hospitalization increases with age and is higher among women than men;
therefore volumes increase. This increase affects the opportunity cost, depending on
the situation.
• The benchmark case is no cap, combined with the introduction of the hospitaliza-
tion criterion into the RA formula. This simply reduces the variance in HCE to
be borne by insurers, thus mitigating incentives for risk selection (see Equation
(4.4)).
• The cap is imposed but not binding initially; it becomes binding with the in-
troduction of the additional RA criterion. Therefore the opportunity cost of the
cap was zero at the beginning. It would become positive but still small if the CS
volume had to be reduced from CHF 4.6 to 4.5 bn. since the effect on insurer
behavior is still limited. However, a future reduction from CHF 6 to 4.5 bn. (say),
would cause opportunity cost to rise (see Equation (4.13)).
• The third alternative is the introduction of the additional RA criterion when the
cap is already binding. On the one hand, this would serve to reduce the volatility
of HCE falling on health insurers. On the other hand, the restriction on CS
volume becomes even more binding. The first effect mitigates incentives for risk
selection, while the second strengthens them. The net effect remains ambiguous
(see Equations (4.4) and (4.13), respectively).
Note that CS and RA volumes can always be reduced by permitting health insurers to
charge premiums that are more in line with true risk. For example, suppose smokers
pay an additional premium of CHF 50 per year. This would decrease the difference
between HCE and premium revenue by CHF 50 ceteris paribus and hence the variance
of payments and with it the risk to be borne by the health insurer. Incentives for
risk selection decrease. The advantage of more risk-rated premiums is that RA volume
declines endogenously without inducing more efforts at risk selection; its drawback is
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deviating from community-rating. Conversely, the advantage of capping CS and RA
volumes is that community-rating can be retained, while its downside is that incentives
for risk selection are strengthened.
4.6.2 Empirical Illustration
Since the unit of reference for Swiss RA is the canton, the effects of limiting its volume
can be exemplified by using data for the canton of Zurich, assuming a decrease of
CS volume from the estimated nationwide CHF 5.375 bn. level to CHF 4.5 bn. The
estimate is derived from pitting expected HCE at the individual level against the
mean applicable to each of the 25 health insurers operating in the Canton of Zurich.
Expected HCE was estimated using a two-part model along the lines of Steinmann
et al. (2007), pooling the data provided by the three health insurers. However, dummy
variables reflecting RA cells replaced continuously measured age. Other dummies are
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Figure 4.2: HCE of women by age, actual, estimated (three insurers), and official,
Switzerland, CHF (2005)
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female gender and canton of residence.
Figure 4.2 shows that the estimated age profile of HCE closely reflects that of the
three insurers (”Actual”) that provided the data. However, the increase of HCE with
higher age at the national level (”Official”) is still underestimated. Overall, estimated
HCE seem to fit the Swiss average sufficiently well to derive estimates of the effect a
cap on CS volume may have, assuming that it is imposed in a way as to minimize its
opportunity cost (as expounded in Section 4.5).
Table 4.5 illustrates the effects of a reduction of CS from CHF 5.375 bn. to CHF 4.5
bn. for the canton of Zurich (number of insured: 1,032,600). Initially the youngest
age class of women pays a premium that exceeds expected HCE by some CHF
1,600, used to finance the higher HCE of Zurich residents above 50 years of age.
Capping the CS volume would reduce this excess by CHF 236. On the other hand,
the highest age group of females currently receives more than CHF 11,000 as a
Table 4.5: Capping the volume of cross-subsidies, canton of Zurich, CHF (2005)
Women Men
Age group Without cap Change With cap Without cap Change With cap
19-25 -1,618 +236 -1,382 -2,347 +236 -2,111
26-30 -1,103 +236 -867 -2,290 +236 -2,054
31-35 -772 +236 -536 -2,191 +236 -1,955
36-40 -830 +236 -594 -2,073 +236 -1,837
41-45 -789 +236 -553 -1,800 +236 -1,564
46-50 -350 +236 -114 -1,479 +236 -1,243
51-55 283 -283 0 -548 +236 -312
56-60 855 -435 421 223 -223 0
61-65 1479 -435 1,045 1,223 -435 788
66-70 2,126 -435 1,691 2,085 -435 1,650
71-75 2,886 -435 2,451 3,301 -435 2,866
76-80 4,191 -435 3,757 3,276 -435 2,841
81-85 5,983 -435 5,549 4,851 -435 4,417
86-90 8,643 -435 8,209 7,162 -435 6,728
90+ 11,250 -435 10,816 9,419 -435 8,985
Note: CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.83 at 2007 exchange rates
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cross-subsidy. This would be reduced by CHF 435. An exception is the class of
51-55 year old women, which changes from receivers to neutral.3 These amounts are
to be compared with the average Zurich premium, which was about CHF 4,000 in 2005.
Naturally, capping the CS volume has an impact on insurers operating in the canton
of Zurich as well. First, the decrease in CS values evidenced in Table 4.5 implies an
increase in the deviations between actual and average HCE falling on them. Therefore,
the variance of HCE borne by them (s2HI in Section 4.5) is bound to increase, very
likely triggering additional risk-selection efforts on their part. This effect would even
be more pronounced if the cap on CS and RA volumes were to be imposed in a
non-optimal way. Second, the amount of RA transferred between insurers would fall.
This effect was estimated in the following way.
Equation (4.1) for determining RA values was implemented using the estimated HCE
function to assign HCE values to age/gender/hospitalization cells of all 25 insurers
operating in the Canton of Zurich. Next, the pool over which RA is defined was
restricted to these 25 insurers. For the canton of Zurich, the error incurred is small
because out of the 1,032,600 insured, only 172,671 do not belong to one of three
insurers considered or one of the additional 22 sampled. Moreover, the resulting
underestimation should not influence the percentage reduction much since it affects
both uncapped and capped values. With the 25 insurers having a nationwide market
share of 60 percent, the resulting total of RA values is scaled up accordingly to obtain
CHF 1.123 bn. as the national estimate prior to imposing a cap (see Table 4.6).
For simplicity, the simulated RA values with the CS cap were not optimized (imple-
menting the Equation system (4.11) would constitute a research paper of its own)
but simply allocated evenly to the age/gender/hospitalization status cells of insurers
according to their shares in current RA volume. Thus, the cap on CS volume would
3According to Equation (4.14), optimal reduction of RA values is the same across risk categories.
However, since the class of 51-55 year old women and 56-60 year old men changes from receiver to
payer, RA values have to be adjusted correspondingly.
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Table 4.6: Change of CS and RA volumes, CHF bn. (2005)
Without cap With cap Change
CS volume between consumers 5.375 4.500 -16.3%
RA volume between insurers 1.123 0.982 -12.5%
Note: CHF 1 ≈ USD 0.83 at 2007 exchange rates
reduce the RA volume by an estimated 12.5 percent. This is markedly less than the 16.3
percent reduction of CS volume because a great deal of CS occurs between consumers
enrolled in a given fund.
4.7 Conclusions
This contribution addresses the conflict of interest arising in the context of imperfect
risk adjustment (RA). On the one hand, a refinement of the RA formula would weaken
health insurers’ incentive to engage in risk selection (given that they are subject
to community-rating). On the other hand, unless fully prospective, RA undermines
their quest for efficiency. There are three novel aspects to this paper. First, it adopts
standard economic theorizing by distinguishing between the insurers who pay (through
their contributions to the RA scheme) and the favorable risks who ultimately bear
these cross-subsidies (CS), amounting to the difference between their actual and their
actuarially fair premium. Second, as a rough-and-ready measure to expose insurers to
a degree of financial risk, a cap on RA is considered and the resulting optimization
problem studied. The issue is to structure the reduced RA values in a way as to
minimize the increase of HCE variance borne by the insurer (and hence risk-selection
effort). Third, the study simulates the consequences of a cap (on total CS rather than
RA volume) both for consumers and insurers.
In a first step, data provided by three Swiss health insurers is compared to official
nationwide averages to assess their representativeness. Overall, the data seems to
accord with official statistics to a sufficient degree to justify more detailed investigation.
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Next, the refinement of the Swiss RA formula effective 2012 is considered. The inclu-
sion of the additional criterion, ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the
previous year”, is found to inflate CS volume by 40 percent on average and to cause age
and gender to lose importance as risk adjusters throughout. This increase of CS (and
hence RA) volume contradicts the objective of enhancing insurers’ incentives for ef-
ficiency by exposing them to more financial risk, to be achieved by a cap on RA volume.
This conflict of interest gives rise to the optimization problem, ”Minimize the HCE
variance falling on the insurer (and therefore the incentive for risk selection), subject
to RA volume not exceeding a politically determined level”. The optimal solution
calls for a uniform reduction of positive and negative RA values the amount of which
depends on existing differences between groups in terms of RA values and their
population shares.
A simulation extrapolating from one Swiss canton shows that a reduction of CS volume
to CHF 4.5 bn. (by 16 percent) at the national level would reduce the RA volume
between insurers by an estimated 12.5 percent. The optimized CS burden would drop
slightly for those up to age 55, juxtaposed by a reduction of CS in favor of those above
55. However, HCE variance falling on insurers would increase, strengthening their
incentives for risk selection.
This research is subject to several limitations. First, the refinement of the RA formula
considered is one among many, e.g. the inclusion of diagnostic information. Second,
capping CS (or RA) values to push insurers towards efficiency is certainly second best.
This objective could be achieved at a lower opportunity cost if alternatives such as
optimized cut-off points in the HCE distribution (beyond which RA sets in) were con-
sidered, with potentially quite different implications for CS values between consumers.
Third, behavior of insurers was assumed to be driven by the HCE variance falling on
them, while that of consumers, by the gap between the actual and the actuarially fair
premium. Especially the latter assumption can be criticized for its neglect of fairness
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considerations. Still, this research does address some of the issues raised by a rough-
and-ready measure that may appeal to politicians, such as simply capping the amount
of RA (or CS) volume.
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5 Fine-Tuning of Health Insurance Regulation: Un-
healthy Consequences for an Individual Insurer
5.1 Introduction
When premiums are mandated to be independent of risk, competitive health insurers
have an incentive to select clients whose future expected health care expenditure
(HCE) does not exceed their contribution. This consideration has induced secondary
regulation in the guise of risk adjustment (RA) schemes. Basically, RA makes insurers
with an above-average share of favorable risks pay into a fund, whose proceeds are
used to cross-subsidize those insurers with many unfavorable risks. The design of an
optimal RA formula is a widely discussed topic (see for example Lamers, 1999, Ellis
and Van de Ven, 2000, Glazer and McGuire, 2002, Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003a,
Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003b, Van de Ven et al., 2004, Beck et al., 2006, Jack, 2006,
Zweifel and Breuer, 2006, and Van de Ven et al., 2007). The RA formulas for Medicare
in the United States and the Netherlands are being refined continuously (see e.g
Douven, 2007 and Calfo, 2009). However, so far the consequences of this fine-tuning
of regulation for the risk management (RM) of insurers seem to have been neglected.
This contribution contains a case study from Switzerland, a country that relies on
competitive health insurance in a way similar to the US and the Netherlands. A RA
scheme was introduced in 1993, using the two criteria age and gender only. Effective
2012, the RA formula will include a third indicator of high risk, viz. ”Hospitalization
of more than three days or living in a nursing home during the previous year” (see
Spycher, 2000). While this choice is largely dictated by service providers’ refusal to
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pass on diagnostic information to health insurers, it does have several recommendable
features in that it (1) has significant predictive power (see Holly et al., 2003 and
Beck, 2004), (2) relates to a previous period so does not undermine insurers’ effort
at controlling health care cost, and (3) can be measured at little administrative expense.
Refinement of the RA formula has gone much further in other countries. In the United
States, the CMS hierarchical condition categories model (CMS-HCC) has been in use
with Medicare since 2004. It uses diagnoses from all clinical encounters, regardless of
whether they are inpatient or outpatient (see Pope et al., 2004). In the Netherlands
diagnostic cost groups (DCGs) and pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs) are used
as high-risk indicators.1 These reforms have their costs and benefits. On the benefit
side, risk-selection efforts by health insurers are reduced if the net cost of medical
care falling on them is increasingly equalized across risk types. Moreover, this net
cost does not depend anymore on whether the insured were hospitalized or not. On
the cost side, these refinements of RA not only require more accounting effort on the
part of both insurers and providers but also increase proneness to error2. Moreover,
they create incentives for up-coding diagnoses (for an explicit analysis of advantages
and disadvantages in the case of United States Medicare, see Pope et al., 2000 and
Kominski, 2007).
The purpose of this paper is to point out another cost of RA refinement. Indeed, it
may boost payments into the RA scheme to an extent as to jeopardize the economic
survival of an otherwise viable health insurer, posing a great challenge to its RM. Now
insolvency and hence market exit of an insurer who only survived thanks to cream
skimming may be considered to be efficiency enhancing. However, this case study
deals with an innovative health insurer, who had successfully implemented Managed
Care (MC) to lower rates of hospitalization. Bankruptcy of such an insurer would
1They are derived from the diagnoses related to prior hospitalization and prior use of prescription
drugs, see e.g. Van de Ven and Schut (2008).
2In the Netherlands, the complexity of processing the data and money flows led to errors in the
calculation of the ex-ante risk-adjusted capitation payments, resulting in a loss of Euro 247 million
(mn.), falling on taxpayers (see Douven, 2007).
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have to be considered inefficient.
The evidence comes from simulating payments for a particular health insurer A into
the RA scheme applying the old and the new formula. These simulations predict
that A’s payments would have increased significantly, attaining between 9 and
13 percent of premium income. Extra payments of these magnitudes would have
seriously endangered insurer A’s economic survival, leading to a cumulative loss
in excess of CHF 250 mn. (CHF 1 ≈ USD 1 at 2010 exchange rates) over three
years. While A’s RM response cannot be predicted, there are two main alternatives.
One is to enlist unfavorable risks, as intended by the regulator. The other is to
extend hospital stays from three to four days. This strategy would have decreased
this insurer’s RA payments by an estimated 11 percent in 2007. The consequences
would be unhealthy for taxpayers (who subsidize hospital cost), employers (who lose
workdays), and patients (who lose quality of life). While not directly transferable to
other countries with competitive health insurance (such as the United States, but
also Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands), the findings of this contribution convey
a clear message. Seemingly minor fine-tuning of health insurance regulation has the
potential of challenging an insurer’s RM, with undesirable consequences for the society.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the method
for calculating risk adjustment values in general and the data basis. In the first part
of Section 5.3, RA values are simulated according to the new formula and applied to
insurer A. The second part of Section 5.3 analyzes the impact of this regulatory change
on insurer A’s RM. The chapter concludes with lessons learned from this case study
and its implications.
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5.2 Simulation of Risk Adjustment Values and
Data Basis
5.2.1 Methodology
Traditionally, analysis of RM focuses on payments between health insurers. However,
this neglects the fact that payments into the RA scheme are ultimately borne by low-
risk consumers while payments from the scheme benefit high-risk consumers. Economic
theory has always distinguished between payers and bearers of a cost or levy, in par-
ticular in the context of an indirect tax. To see the analogy, consider current Swiss
RA with two criteria age and gender only. Define P¯ as the community-rated premium,
L¯a,g, as the average HCE in one of the age-gender cells (a, g) of RA (neglecting admin-
istrative expense for simplicity), and RAa,g as the payment to or from the RA scheme.
The premium paid by a specific individual i who is a low risk compared to the cohort
in the age-gender cell (a, g), and whose expected cost E(Li) is thus below average for
the specific cell can then be expressed as
P¯ = L¯a,g +RAa,g, with RAa,g > 0 (5.1)
= E(Li) + (L¯a,g − E(Li)) + (P¯ − L¯a,g). (5.2)
This particular low risk bears, on top of his or her actuarially fair premium E(Li), a
cross-subsidy in favor of high risks consisting of two components. The first component
is the difference between average HCE of group (a, g) and the individual’s expected
HCE denoted by E(Li); the second, the contribution to the RA scheme (P¯−L¯a,g), to be
paid by the insurer. The sum of the two will be referred to as cross-subsidization values.
As to the second component, the current Swiss RA formula comprises 15 age classes,
starting from age 19 to 25 and continuing in 5-year steps. Thus, there are overall 30 RA
categories. Since by law risk adjustment must not lead to a cross-subsidization between
the 26 cantons (i.e. member states of Switzerland), the RA values are calculated yearly
for each canton by the Joint Organization KVG based on data of all Swiss health
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insurers (see Joint Organization KVG, 2008). Adopting the insurer’s point of view
rather than the consumer’s now, the RA values are equal to
RAa,g = L¯a,g − L¯ (5.3)
with L¯ (= P¯ in Equation (5.1) since administrative expense is neglected) denoting
average HCE in the canton’s population as a whole (see Beck et al., 2006, Chapter 4).
Including the criterion ”hospitalization”3 changes Equation (5.3) to
RAa,g,h = L¯a,g,h − L¯. (5.4)
The subscript h is equal to 1 if a hospital stay in the previous year exceeds three
days and 0 otherwise. Average HCE of the respective RA cell, L¯a,g,h, now has to be
calculated for 60 instead of 30 groups, while L¯ remains the same.
The insurer has to contribute to the RA fund for favorable risks (L¯a,g,h<L¯). The RA
fund uses the proceeds to cover the deficits generated by unfavorable risks (L¯a,g,h>L¯).
An insurer’s total payment (V ) into/from the RA fund depends on the composition of
its insured over all 26 cantons (c),
V =
26∑
c=1
1∑
h=0
1∑
g=0
15∑
a=1
RAa,g,h,c · na,g,h,c. (5.5)
An insurer receives payments if V >0 and contributes to risk adjustment if V <0.
5.2.2 Data Basis
For calculating the RAa,g,h,c values in Equation (5.5) for a given health insurer,
the cell-specific averages L¯a,g,h,c must be known. Since RAa,g,h,c is not published
by the Joint Organization KVG, two different sources are used to analyze the
3This is shorthand for ”Hospitalization or living in a nursing home during the previous year of four
days and more”.
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impact of the new RA formula on an individual health insurer. The first is con-
structed by merging individual HCE data provided by three large health insurers
in order to calculate the average RAa,g,h,c. Ideally it should be representative of all
Swiss health insurers. The second data base comes from the one individual Swiss
health insurer ”A”. Both are limited to individuals having mandatory health insurance.
Descriptive Statistics
Data of the three large Swiss health insurers (out of a total of 70 serving a population
of 7.5 mn.) is available for the period 2001 to 2005. The sample is well balanced with
respect to gender (49.5 percent of women), and average age of adult enrollees (47.4
years in 2005, compared to 47.8 years of the adult population). The market share
covered is stable across age classes, amounting to 25 percent on average. With regard
to choice of contract, there is a clear trend towards higher deductibles. The three
highest deductibles (CHF 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500; CHF 1 ≈ USD 1 at 2010 exchange
rates) increased in importance from 12 to over 22 percent from 2001 to 2005, which is
compared to the official figures of 13 and 23 percent very representative (sante´suisse,
2010a). There is a similar trend in favor of MC contracts, reaching a share of 11
percent in 2005 (compared to the Swiss average of less than 10 percent in 2005, see
Chapter 4).
The second data source, obtained from A, covers the period 2001 to 2007. With 51.3
percent of women, the sample is almost balanced. A is one of the medium-sized health
insurers in Switzerland with a market share of almost 5 percent in 2005. With 47.7
years, average age of A’s adult enrollees is slightly higher than the 47.4 years of the
three insurers. The clientele of A also tends towards higher deductibles. The share
of the three highest deductibles (they are CHF 1,000, CHF 1,500, and CHF 2,500)
exceeds the nation-wide average of 22 percent in 2005. MC contracts account for
almost 35 percent (2007), double the nationwide average of 16.9 percent (sante´suisse,
2010b). This most likely explains A’s comparatively low rate of hospitalization (see
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Figure 5.3 below).4 On the whole, A looks like an innovative insurer that encourages
MC options, in conformity with stated objectives of Swiss policy makers.
Checking Simulated RA Payments
First, the data provided by the three large health insurers had to be checked for
representativeness using the current RA formula. The values for RAa,g were calculated
for all 30 cells along with their standard errors according to the methodology described
in Section 5.2.1 and compared with the official nationwide values. The insurers on
average pay for women aged 19 to 25 more than CHF 1,700 per year (see Figure 5.1
for the canton of Zurich, the leading canton of Switzerland both in terms of GDP and
population, and Table 4.2 in Chapter 4, page 78, for all cantons). Conversely, they
receive payment for over 90 year old women to the tune of some CHF 8,600. While
the fit is good in general, RA contributions by the three insurers are lower than the
official figures from age 61 on.
Based on the evidence, one can conclude that the three major health insurers sampled
are sufficiently representative of the Swiss population to enable a simulation of the new
RA formula based on their data. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that one
of the three is a net recipient of payments from the RA scheme, one breaks even,
and one is a net contributor to the scheme. Also note that according to Table 4.2 in
Chapter 4 (page 78), the standard error and hence variance of RA payments increases
with age, reflecting the fact that variance of HCE increases as well. This means that
for a risk-averse health insurer, risk-selection effort has a high payoff if focused on older
clients. By the same token, however, an insurer like A who counts on having to pay into
the RA scheme permanently faces a liability characterized by great risk as its insured
population ages.
4In the US, MC plans have achieved most cost savings by reducing inpatient hospital use (see
Miller and Luft, 1997 and Bindman et al., 2005. For MC cost savings in Switzerland see Lehmann
and Zweifel, 2004).
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Figure 5.1: Official RA values according to age and gender, canton of Zurich, CHF
(2005)
Figure 5.2: Estimated RA values with and without hospitalization according to age
and gender, canton of Zurich, CHF (2005)
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5.3 Simulating the Impacts of the New RA Formula
In this section, estimated RA values with the new RA formula including hospitalization
during the previous year are presented first. Then, the impacts of the regulatory fine-
tuning on health insurer A in terms of financial burden and choice of strategy are
shown.
5.3.1 Risk Adjustment with the New Criterion
Official RA values grouped according to the additional criterion, ”Hospitalization
during the previous year” are not available.5 They have been simulated using the
individual HCE data provided by the three major health insurers (see Section 5.2.2).
Figure 5.2 illustrates estimated RAa,g,h,c values for the canton of Zurich.
Comparing Figures 5.1 and 5.2 the new formula is seen to induce radical changes. First
of all, it causes the amount of cross-subsidization between those without a hospital
stay in the previous year to shrink considerably beyond age 70. Conversely, it causes
persons with a hospital stay to be cross-subsidized regardless of age or gender. Second,
and related to this, the usual age profile ceases to exist. For instance, hospitalized
women in the 19 to 25 age group benefit more than the three next older groups, and at
the high end, it is the aged 86 to 90 rather than the oldest that benefit most. Among
men, the age profile becomes almost level beyond age 70. Third, the per capita amounts
now are higher, pointing to a substantial increase in the volume of cross-subsidization.
In Chapter 4 the effects of introducing the third criterion on the total volume of cross-
subsidization is simulated for 2005. An increase of 40 percent, from CHF 4.13 billion
(bn.) to CHF 5.82 bn., or some 12 percent of Swiss HCE is found. Whether this is
excessive or not is an issue that cannot be addressed in this paper. However, a change
of this magnitude is likely to present a challenge to the RM of at least some health
insurers. Whether this is the case of insurer A is the topic of the two subsections below.
5Official statistics do show RA values as ”RA payments between consumers”, but only according
to the current RA formula (see Joint Organization KVG, 2008).
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5.3.2 Impacts on Risk Adjustment Payments by Health
Insurer A
The consequences of adding the new risk adjuster ”hospitalization” for health insurer A
can be simulated as follows. The volume of payments is calculated as the number of A’s
customers in a RA cell6, times the estimated RA value pertaining to that RA cell, and
adding up (see Equation (5.5), Section 5.2.1). These calculations are performed using
the old and the new RA formula for the years 2005 to 2007. They allow to ”postdict”
the consequences the new RA formula would have had if already in effect. The results
are striking.
• Total payments of A into the RA scheme increase substantially. Under the old
formula, they amount to CHF 24.2 mn. in 2005, corresponding to 3 percent of
premium income. Had the new RA formula already been in effect, they would
have reached CHF 101.6 mn., amounting to no less than 13 percent of premium
income. Considering that A operated at a loss of CHF 8.2 mn. in 2005, the
new formula would, ceteris paribus, have caused a total loss of CHF 85.6 mn.
(= 8.2 + 101.6− 24.2).
• For the years 2006 and 2007, payments according to the new RA formula are
estimated to be CHF 73.5 and CHF 82.3 mn., respectively, compared to the CHF
2.6 mn. and CHF 2.3 mn. under the current RA formula. In terms of premium
income, the shares would have been 9 and 13 percent, respectively, resulting in
losses of CHF 54.8 and CHF 86.2 mn., ceteris paribus.
• Payments of A into the RA scheme increase in all cantons. In some, A even turns
from receiver into payer, such as in the cantons of Vaud (VD) and Geneva (GE).
This precludes a regional restructuring of A’s business as a possible RM response;
for this reason, this alternative will not be discussed in Section 5.3.3 below.
Arguably, these developments would have jeopardized A’s economic survival. Starting
with the underwriting result, the combined ratio (defined as loss payments plus
6For added precision, calculations are based on months of contract life.
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administrative expense plus RA values relative to premium income) was very close to
100 percent over the time period considered, viz. 102.3 (2005), 99.8 (2006), and 100.3
percent (2007).7 This is not fatal as long as the insurer is making enough profits from
capital investment (see e.g. Zweifel and Eisen, 2005, Chapter 5), which was indeed the
case in 2007. However, the new RA formula would have caused the combined ratio to
attain 111.9 (2005), 107.5 (2006), and 110.7 percent (2007) respectively, amounts that
could not have easily been compensated by profits from capital investment. According
to Browne and Hoyt (1995), who analyze market predictors of insolvencies in US
property-liability insurance between 1970 and 1990, a 5 point increase of the combined
ratio causes the insolvency rate to increase by roughly 22 percent. Even if this result
cannot be directly applied to health insurers operating in a different country, a 10
point hike in the combined ratio must substantially increase the insolvency risk of an
insurer who has limited reserves. The ordinance on health insurance (Federal Council
of Switzerland, 2003) requires insurers to hold reserves as a function of enrollment.
With more than 150,000 insured, A currently must have reserves amounting to 10
percent of annual premiums (sante´suisse, 2009). If A would have used its reserves to
make up for the predicted loss of 2005 under the new RA formula, this ratio would
have fallen to around 5 percent. The predicted loss of 2006 and 2007 would have wiped
out its reserves altogether.
The insolvency of an insurer could be the result of lackluster performance and hence
of little importance to the economy as a whole. However, this does not seem to be
true of insurer A. It did incur a loss in 2005 but was able to turn this into a surplus
for the years 2006 and 2007. In addition, its high predicted payments into RA under
the new RA formula are due to its low hospitalization rates (see Figure 5.3). For men
(gray bars), they are significantly lower than the Swiss average (black bars) across all
age groups (women similar but not shown). While successful risk selection cannot be
excluded completely as an explanation, the evidence points in a different direction.
7The expense ratio was 5.6 (2005), 5.9 (2006) and 5.6 percent (2007), which is average for Swiss
statutory health insurers.
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Figure 5.3: Hospitalization rate, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, men (2005)
First, as stated in Section 5.2.2, the younger age classes and men are only slightly
over-represented. A systematic risk selector would have significantly higher market
shares in this age segment. Second, MC contracts (designed to prevent or shorten
hospital stays) attain a share of 35 percent in 2007, way above the Swiss average of
16.9 percent. At the same time, insurer A’s distribution of MC contracts across age
classes does not systematically differ from that of the representative three insurers.
Third, total HCE per enrollee and its age profile are quite similar between insurer A
and the three others, speaking against across-the-board risk-selection effort on the part
of the insurer A. By way of contrast, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 reveal a marked difference
with regard to the cost of inpatient and outpatient care. Starting with the age group
51 to 55 but especially beyond age 81, insurer A is markedly below the simulated
nationwide benchmark (Figure 5.4). Now this could still be due to risk-selection efforts
cleverly targeted at the healthy elderly. In that case, however, one would also expect
insurer A’s cost for outpatient care to be comparatively low in the higher age groups.
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Figure 5.4: Inpatient cost, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, CHF (2005)
Figure 5.5: Outpatient cost, insurer A vs. simulated nationwide values, CHF (2005)
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Yet Figure 5.5 shows that insurer A’s cost of outpatient care per enrollee is higher
than that of the three representative insurers, and particularly so in the high age groups.
These findings lend credibility to insurer A’s claim to have implemented MC in general
and home care instead of hospital care specifically for the elderly. This has positive
effects not only for the individual patient whose quality of life is higher, but also
for the economy as a whole. Indeed, the cost of inpatient care evidenced in Figure
5.4 is only one-half of the true value since the cantons finance roughly 50 percent
of hospitals’ operating cost. Implementation of MC concepts thus provides relief to
taxpayers. Hence, rather than acting as a ”cherry-picker”, insurer A seems to be
among the foremost in conforming with stated objectives of Swiss health policy, i.e. to
achieve savings through MC. Insolvency of such an insurer caused by a change in the
RA formula can be justifiably qualified as regulatory failure.
5.3.3 Impact on Risk Management
It is unlikely that an insurer confronted with the changes described in the preceding
sections can continue with its RM strategy unchanged. The two main alternatives
revolve around the two principal activities of an insurer, viz. underwriting and capital
investment. Starting with the latter, the insurer could seek offsetting returns on
capital investments. However, in the present state of the economy this is very difficult.
In addition, capital market theory predicts that higher expected returns can only
be achieved in return for more risk once the efficient frontier has been reached, a
consequence that is not easily accepted by a regulator of social health insurance. The
second possibility is to increase margins from underwriting either by increasing net
premiums or reducing claims. Swiss statutory health insurers have to pay by law
for all services included in the official list of benefits, with most prices regulated.
Therefore, it is not possible to decrease insurance claims significantly. Liabilities
arising from underwriting can be reduced by purchasing reinsurance; however, up
to present reinsurers have not been providing coverage against RA liabilities. This
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leaves an increase of premiums net of RA payments as the likely RM response. Since
premiums are fixed by community-rating regulation, lowering payments into the RA
scheme becomes the preferred alternative.
One way to achieve this objective is to enroll more unfavorable risks, in particular
persons who were hospitalized during the previous year. This is the adjustment the
new RA formula was designed to bring about. The challenge to the insurer’s RM
now becomes to achieve more hospitalizations without incurring much additional cost.
Recall that a hospitalization counts as soon as it exceeds three days. When segmenting
A’s HCE function according to length of stay in the hospital during the previous year,
it turns out that patients with four days do not cost significantly more than those
with three. Therefore, A has to weigh the once-and-for-all extra cost of a hospital day
against the extra contribution from the RA scheme, which may amount to several
thousand CHF (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4, page 78).
The possible reduction of RA payments can be estimated as follows. While it may
not be possible to collude with the public hospitals (who obtain a per diem roughly
twice the amount paid by the insurer because one-half of their extra operating cost
is covered by the canton) to extend all hospital stays from three to four days, this
should be possible in 50 percent of all cases. The effect of such a RM response can
be estimated with sufficient precision for the three cantons where A has the highest
market share (viz. Zurich (ZH), Berne (BE), and Vaud (VD)). There, it would have
reduced RA payments by CHF 5 mn. in 2007. Extrapolating to A’s entire book of
business, one obtains CHF 9 mn., or 11.2 percent of the estimated CHF 82.3 mn.
Savings of this magnitude would have been important enough to induce a change in RM.
The cost of this change would fall on taxpayers (who cover one half of the increased
operating costs of public hospital through cantonal subsidies), employers (who bear the
workdays lost), and patients (who presumably enjoy a higher quality of life outside the
hospital). For this reason, reducing the length of hospital stays has been a stated goal
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of Swiss health policy, notably justifying the introduction of hospital payment through
diagnosis-related groups by 2012 (DRGs, see SwissDRG, 2009). Thus, the fine-tuning
of regulation through an improvement of the RA formula risks to burden the economy
with sizable inefficiencies.
5.4 Conclusions
Regulation may pose unintended challenges to the risk management (RM) of a
company. This chapter analyzes the case of health insurance, where the imposition of
community-rating creates an incentive to select favorable risks. Risk adjustment (RA)
schemes have been implemented in several countries such as Germany, Israel, the
Netherlands, and the United States to counteract this incentive. They make insurers
with an above-average share of favorable risks (indicated by age, gender, and other
adjusters) to pay into the scheme, which supports insurers with an above-average
share of unfavorable risks. Since its current RA formula fails to neutralize the
incentive for risk selection, Switzerland will complement it in 2012 with the adjuster,
”Hospitalization of more than three days or living in a nursing home during the
previous year”. This seemingly minor fine-tuning of regulation is shown to have a
potentially fatal effect on a particular health insurer A whose payments into the RA
scheme would have increased substantially between 2005 and 2007 if the new RA
formula had been in effect. The reason is a low rate of hospitalization thanks to a
commitment to Managed Care (MC). Therefore, A’s most likely RM response would
have been to increase recognized hospitalizations by increasing length of stay from
three to four days, triggering extra payments from the RA scheme at a limited once-
and-for-all cost of an extra hospital day. The cost of this change of RM strategy would
have been borne by taxpayers (through increased subsidies of hospitals’ operating ex-
pense), employers (through lost workdays), and patients (through lower quality of life).
There are lessons to be learned for other countries who impose community-rating on
competitive health insurers. First, it is practically impossible to fully neutralize insur-
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ers’ risk selection incentive through an RA scheme,8 and be it only due to their different
rates of discount in estimating the present value of the benefits and costs associated
with risk selection. Second, perfecting the RA formula can have unintended side effects
at the level of an individual insurer that go as far as jeopardizing its economic survival
in spite of innovative effort. In the case studied here, the insurer is even punished
for its innovative commitment to MC. Finally, the threat of survival may well trig-
ger adjustments in RM strategy that cause an efficiency loss to the economy as a whole.
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6 Conclusions
This chapter discusses policy implications and possible extensions of each essay.
If premiums are community-rated in social statutory health insurance, preferences of
the insured have to be the crucial factor for determining the uniform benefit package.
From a cost-benefit perspective and neglecting distributional concerns, inclusion of
a treatment or pharmaceutical is justified if the insured exhibit a willingness-to-pay
that exceeds the cost of treatment, i.e. not only patients’ (ex-post) willingness-to-pay,
but also potential patients’ (ex-ante) willingness-to-pay has to be sufficiently high.
Chapter 2 demonstrates that this indeed seems to be the case for the long-acting
insulin analogue ”Insulin Detemir” in Germany. Respondents not only value attributes
such as avoidance of hypoglycemia and weight gain, but also attach importance to
attributes that typically are judged medically irrelevant, such as lack of preparation
(swinging) the insulin before use and flexibility of timing of the injection. For these
reasons, the new insulin analogue should be included in the German statutory health
insurance list of benefits.
The implications of Chapter 3 appear to be very specific, but address an issue of
general importance. In particular, the results show that the assumption of a linearly
approximated utility function can result in biased estimates of willingness-to-pay. In
general, however, Chapter 3 illustrates that model assumptions can have significant
impact on produced results. Hence, when performing discrete-choice experiments,
the underlying assumptions need to be tested. When making decisions based on
discrete-choice experiments, one has to be aware that the results rely on assumptions.
This is not only an issue solely in such experiments or in health economics. For
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example, this problem surfaced during the financial credit risk management crisis of
the last three years, when the Gaussian-copula assumption in the pricing of credit
derivatives led to underestimation of extreme events (see Donnelly and Embrechts,
2010).
The findings of Chapter 4 outline that policy makers need to distinguish between
the insurers, who pay contributions to the risk-adjustment scheme, and the favorable
risks, who ultimately bear these cross-subsidies by paying more than their actuarially
fair premium. With the criteria of age and gender, the elderly mainly receive payments
from risk adjustment. Including the additional criterion ”Hospitalization or living in
a nursing home during the previous year” (”hospitalization” henceforth) changes the
redistribution profile significantly. Hospitalization becomes the crucial factor. When
adding additional risk adjusters, such as diagnostic categories or pharmaceutical cost
groups, the redistribution effects have to be reexamined. However, there is a trade-off
when adding hospitalization to the risk-adjustment formula. This refinement reduces
insurers’ incentives for risk selection, but it will also increasingly shelter insurers
from financial risk, undermining efficiency. Consequently, a cap on the volume of risk
adjustment may well improve insurers’ efficiency, but it also increases incentives for risk
selection. To minimize this cost, Chapter 4 proposes a uniform reduction of positive
and negative risk-adjustment values by a certain amount, depending on existing dif-
ferences between groups in terms of risk-adjustment values and their population shares.
The inclusion of the hospitalization criterion in the risk-adjustment formula was
expected to punish only the ”cherry-pickers” among the health insurers. However,
Chapter 5 illustrates the unintended side effects for an innovative insurer who is
among the foremost in conforming to the stated objectives of Swiss health policy, i.e.
to achieve savings through Managed Care. This can go as far as to jeopardize the
firm’s economic survival, punishing it for its innovative effort. This threat to survival
may trigger adjustments in risk-management strategy that cause efficiency losses to
the economy as a whole. For this reason, policy makers should consider the direct and
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partial effects of regulations alongside their side effects and general implications.
Each chapter could form the basis for the extension of future research.
The survey conducted in Chapter 2 includes much information that has not yet
been evaluated. So far, only heterogeneity with respect to diabetic status has been
analyzed. Further criteria for heterogeneity could be discovered. Conversely, it would
also be interesting to analyze homogeneity observed in certain cases. For example,
non-diabetics were asked if one of their closest family members was diabetic. One
would expect these respondents to have a higher willingness-to-pay for modern insulin
therapy; presumably they would be altruistic toward their family members, but their
own risk to become insulin-dependent might be above average, too (Hauner, 2010).
Another extension of Chapter 2 could be to apply the findings of Chapter 3. The
discrete-choice experiment of Chapter 2 could be re-estimated using a non-linear
utility function.
Chapter 3 addresses just one specific issue of the discrete-choice approach. However,
around 40 percent of respondents in this experiment never deviated from their status
quo. No information from these respondents could be gained because they never
”jump” over the indifference curve. Future research could model this decision process
by a two-stage estimation procedure, similar to the two-part model used to estimate
health care expenditure. In a first step, one would estimate the probability that the
respondent chooses the alternative at least once. The second step would model the
probability of choosing the alternative, given that the respondent deviated from the
status quo at least once.
The most likely future development in Swiss risk adjustment comes from the formula
being extended by further criteria. A likely candidate is pharmaceutical cost groups,
as already in use in the Netherlands (Lamers and Van Vliet, 2003b). Beck et al.
(2010) found that these groups would decrease incentives for risk selection significantly
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in Switzerland. An enhancement of Chapter 4 would simulate the effects of this
additional criterion on the volume of cross-subsidization. However, the required
individual-level data is not yet accessible. Another future research question could
utilize more sophisticated risk measures in Chapter 4. Instead of the variance, either
value-at-risk or expected shortfall would disclose the optimization of the derived
uniform reductions per risk class.
While the hospitalization criterion successfully weakens incentives for risk selection,
insurers are only compensated for inpatient treatments. Adding diagnostic or phar-
maceutical cost groups into the risk-adjustment formula could mitigate the resulting
incentives. If such individual-level data were available, the consequences for insurer
A could be simulated. Payments into the risk-adjustment scheme would probably be
much lower, accounting for the insurer’s higher-than-average outpatient costs.
However, there is an alternative that avoids the issues induced by community-rating.
According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) the first-best Pareto-optimum equilibrium
for (health) insurance, given public information about risk, is full coverage for
both high and low risks, associated with high and low premiums. That is, health
insurers would be permitted to charge premiums reflecting the difference in risk. With
sufficient pressure of competition, this would boil down to ”price equal to expected
marginal cost”, since expected future health care expenditure importantly reflect
the insurer’s cost of enrolling an additional customer. However, when introducing
risk-based premiums, equity issues would likely be raised. Wealthy individuals could
pay a high risk-based premium out of their own pockets. Low-income individuals who
are favorable risks could also pay for their own premiums. Low-income individuals
who are unfavorable risks, however, are a problematic group. For this reason, instead
of community-rating, an additional solution requiring less market intervention has
been proposed in the literature. Low-income unfavorable risks would be entitled to an
earmarked subsidy that kicks in as soon as their premium exceeds a certain percentage
of their income (see Zweifel and Breuer, 2006). In fact, the new health insurance law
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of 2004 introduced such a targeted subsidy in Switzerland without eliminating the
premium regulation introduced in 1911. It is thus unlikely that risk-based premiums
will be introduced in Switzerland soon. For this reason, the topic of this dissertation
will remain important in the future.
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